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Eucalyptus planting in West Papua 
threatens tribal people 
Tribal people in Merauke, West Papua face ,a new threat 
from a foreign investment project for a huge eucalyptus 
plantation in Merauke, West Papua. The Indonesian 
Investment Board (BK PM) has apprwed the project, worth 
$653~8 million, which will finance eucalyptus planting 
and the construction of a pulp and paper factory. 
[Jakarta Post, 27 October] 
The investment is being made by the Scott Paper 
Company in Philadelphia, working in collaboration with 
P. T. Astra, Indonesia's second largest corporation, 
which has subsidiaries in alma;t every line of business 
frcm automobiles to timber concessions and agribusiness. 
The project, to be run by a venb.lre called P.T Astra-
Scott Cellulosa, plans to use 200,000 hectares of land 
in Mera.ike which can only mean the dispossession of 
tribal lands at present t11e home of the Marind, Yei and 
Kanum people. 
A feasibility study for the project was carried out by 
the Canadian company, Lavalin International (we 
previously wrc:ngly identified Lavalin as a us company), 
together with the forestry department of G ajah Mada 
University in Jogjakarta. 
Ecological devastation 
The conversion of such a huge area of land into 
eucalyptus plantations will not only uproot tre present 
inhabitants, already badly affected by the expropriation 
of much of their land for transmigration sites. It will 
also wreak devastati<n by turning a region with a varied 
vegetation that provides tribal people with their 
proteins and hunting grounds, into a monccultural 
project, forcing prople to change their way of life. The 
present vegetation consists of sago palm, eucalyptus 
stands and otter plants which flourish in, and provide 
the moisture for, the swamps that are the source of 
three local rivers. If the natural vegetation is 
removed, the rivers could dry up, further aggravating 
the water sh:>rtage that has already caused such havoc 
for the existing transmigration sites. 
The existing vegetation has religious significance for 
the inhabitants. Moreover, it is feared that unwanted 
species woo.ld be removed with Dioxin, a chemical which 
has boon used by the rompany elsew re re. This is krown to 
cause leukemia, liver and lung diseases, birth defects 
and miscarriages in laboratory animals. 
Third World campaign against the 
eucalyptus 
The adverse social and ecologicc:tl impact of large-
scale eucalyptus planting is the focus of a campaign 
launched in September by the Third World Network in 
Malaysia. It highlights a number of hazards: excessive 
absorption of water inhibiting other plant growth, loss 
of nutrients in the soil, the spread of toxicity and the 
threatofdesertification. The Network's Urgent Action, 
based on grassroots p:rotest.s against eucalyptus planting 
in Thailand and India, is directed at the world Bank 
which, together with the UK's Overseas Development 
Administration, is funding eucalyptl.ls planting in many 
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EASTDMOR • 
'Timor Gap' petroleum 
share-out agreed 
Canberra and Jakarta have reamed an interim agreement 
to set up a 'zone of cooperation' in the sea between 
Australia arrl East Timor, the so-called Timor Gap, which 
will enable petroleum companies in Australia and 
Indonesia to go ahead with exploration arrl exploitation 
of off-shore oil resexves thought to contain up to a 
billion barrels of oil. 
The interim agreement is the first contributioo 
towart:E improving :relabals between the two countries by 
Australia's new Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans. 
Pr:ior to his present job, Gareth Evans was the Minister 
for Resources and Energy. 
'£he agreement prompted a rebuke from the Portuguese 
Government, describing it as "a blatant and serious 
breach of internaticnal law" because Indonesia's 
unilateral annexation of East Timar has not been 
recognised by the international community. Moreover, 
efforts are proceeding at the UN "with the aim of 
guaranteeing the Timorese people their leg:i,timate .tight 
to self-determination according to the UN Charter". 
The interim agreement has been welcomed by petroleum 
interests :in Australia who forecast that if the reserves 
are as bounteous as currently expected, they will 
"significantly slow down the decline in Australian 
petroleum reserves" [The Age, 6 September]. 
The agreement has been reached after nine years of 
negotiations. The eagerness of Australian oil companies 
to clear the way for exploiting the Timor 'Gap has been 
the primary factor in Canberra's decision, urrler both 
Liberal and Labour <pvemments, to recognise Indonesia's 
illegal annex:atioo of East Tim or. 
, _, 
Agreed Seabed Boum:Jary 
... -, 
,,,..,-C ::>,-~ ... ---
.... -.::-tt~- ........ \ 
I ~ ... - I 
.,....... \ 
I \ 
,,,)\ AREA A \ 
, \ /~ 
~ \ I' \ 
--- \ / I • , _____ I' \ 
\ \ 
\ AREA B ) 
\ ---',,.,,,,.,,"~ 




It is interim in narure because the two countries have 
not yet agreed on a permanent seabed boundary in the 
stretch of sea south of East Timor. The agreement 
divides the potentially-rich area into three zones. Zone 
A, the area thought most likely to contain oil, will be 
jointly worked, with a 50:50 share of the profits. Zone 
B will be governed by Australia, with 16 per cent of net 
revenuesgoingtoindonesia. Zone C will be <pvemed by 
Indonesia, with 10 per cent of company tax revenue 
passing to Australia. ~ 
Portugal condemns Indonesia at UN 
In Portugal's strorgest denunciation yet at the United 
Natic:os, the Foreign Minister, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, 
speaking at the G01eral Assembly on 5 October, rejected 
Indonesia's occupation of East Timar and called for 
self-determination for its people .• 
"No circumstances whatsoever can legitimise the 
ruthless way in which repression was waged in the 
territory, with an :Intolerable prire in human lives and 
suffering". He regretted the flagrant violation of the 
principle of self-determination by a country which was 
equally subject to colonialism. 
"It is 13 years since the non-self-g01Terning territory 
of East Timar under Portuguese administration saw its 
pnxess of decolooisation interrupted and was invaded by 
a powerfQl neighbour." 
"Portugal <bes not reject its share in responsibility 
for the difficulties and troubles which affected that 
process in its beginnings, but we · cannot accept that 
such events legitimise the invasion _and occupation by 
Indonesia and the subsequent denial of the fundamental 
rights and freeoom of its people~" 
In conclusion, he said: "East Timer is for us a moral, 
historical and legal responsibility. We cannot ignore 
~drarnaof F.astTirnorunless we beoome accomplices of 
an intolerable policy of fait accompli, imposed by 
force." 
General Assembly again postpones resolution 
For the sixth year running, the General Assembly 
decided in October not to discuss a resolution on East 
Timor. The last time a resolution was tabled was in 1982 
when the General Assembly agreed by 50 votes to 46 to 
ask the Secretary-General to "initiate consultations 
with all parties directly concerned, with a view to 
exploring avenues fur achieving a oomprehensive 
settlement of the pr()blem". 
The stated reason for the postponement was that 
negotiatioos are un::ler way .at the UN between PorbJgal 
and IndonesU:i. regard:ing a possible visit to East Timor 
by a mission of parliamentarians from Portugal. * 
* Note tx:> readers * 
Due to lack of space, we are unable to summarise more 
petitions to the UN Decolonisatioo Committee ill Augus~ 
We hope to continue the series in the next issue. 
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Portuguese MPs visit Japan 
During a visit to Japan from l.8 to 25 September, a 
delegation of Portuguese parliamentarians warmly 
welcomed the Japanese Parliamentarian Forum on East 
Timar. The mission was readed by Maria Manuela Aguiar, 
Social Democrat, vice-chair of the Portuguese National 
Assembly. 
According to R ui Silva of too Democratic Renovation 
Partywroisa memberofthe Parliamentary Commissioo on 
East Timor, the delegation explained Portugal's position 
on East.Timorduringa meeting with the Japanese Foreign 
Minister, Sousuke Uno, and referred to the European 
Parliament's resolution on East Timar. The Foreign 
Minister made no comment arrl brought the visit to an end 
as soon as the East Timor issue was raised. 
Nevertheless, the visiting parliamentarians were 
impressed by the strongcx:immitmentamongJapanese MPs to 
East Timer's right to self-determination. During a 
meetirg' wfth women MPs, 'l'amako Nakanishi asked whether 
Portugal felt it had nothlng to do with the East Timor 
tra~dy since tlH~ Indonesian invt:ision occurred after 
East Timor' s declaraticn of indeperrlence. The Portuguese 
said that Portugal has a responsibility for both self-
determination and human rights but would prefer not to 
actalooe; in particular, it wants the UN's cooperation. 
Two East Timorese1 Jooe Guterres from Lisbon and Jose 
GusmaJ from Darwin, weredoo tovisit Japan m November. 
Portu<jUese MPs during their visil:: to Japan 
The Free East Timar Coalition planned to organise public 
meetings for them in more than twenty places, from 
Hokkaicbto Okinawa. We hope to :report on their tr.ip in 
the next issue. ~ 
US Congress members renew 
concern about E Timor 
-.1n 30 October, tie day before President Suharto paid a 
visit to East'rimor, it was anrounced in Washington that 
47 OS Senators and .182 members of the House of 
Representatives joined in sending letters to Secretary 
of State, Ge::>rge Shultz, renewi.ng their concern about 
East Timor. '!'he signatories from the Senate included 
three-quarters of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. 
Releasing the Senators' letter, David Durenberger, 
Republican Senator for Minnesota, said: "By sending this 
letter now, my colleagues and I want to ensure that the 
DPR members drafting their 
own petition 
The statements about East Tim or by 22 9 members of 
the us Congress has stung members of Incbnesia's 
parliarnen~ the DP R, into action. They are drafting 
a petition to the US congress. It will, acc...""Ording to 
an (urmamed> member, denounce the comments as 
"groundless and Obtained from false sources". 
Alleging that there are no more problems in r: ast 
Timor, the member regretted that the US Congress 
"still questicns something which no lcnger needs to 
bequestioood". He eq::ected 250 DPR members to sign 
the petition; he did not explain why all five 
hurrlred DP R members would not sign. [Jakarta Post, 
16 November] 
East Timor tragerly receives increased attention, both 
from the Reagan Administration and its successor• The 
long agony of East 'l'imor continues. I hope this letter 
will remind the State Department of this fact." 
The letter expressed concern about th~ transfer of 
East Timorese prisoners to Jakarta, the torture of 
Timorese under interrogation and tt.e denial cf access to 
international human right.s organisations: "Freedom of 
express.ion for citizens of East Timer, including most 
Roman Catholic clergy, continues to be virtually non-
existalt." 
Calling for a negotiated end to the conflict, the 
Senators said: "We believe that the United States could 
help bring the parties involved in the East Timor 
conflict to the negotiating table to begin a process 
that could end this 13-year tragedy." 
The f.irst time Senator Durenberger sponsored a letter 
on East 'l'imor, .in 1982, he got the support of 16 
Senators; now that number has almost trebled. 
Congressional concern could force Bush 
Administration tn act 
Releasing tte letter sigred by 182 House members, Tony 
Hall, Democrat for Ohio, said: "The growing concern in 
Congress is a clear sign that the next Administration 
will be forced to deal with the human rights problems 
... 
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and continuing conflict in East 1'irnor." 
'fhe letter said: "The continuing oonflict... has 
contributed, both directly and indirectly, to food 
shortages and health problems .•. We believe that the 
reports of persistent fighting and ongoing shortages of 
food and medical supplies in East Timor merit the 
concern of the US Congress ...• We are cmcemed by the 
implication of Indonesian Defence Minister Bem\y 
Murdani's recentremarkthat EastTimor is mly 'open to 
selectedprople'. We seek efforts by the US Governmai.t 
to ensure both the rontinuation and expansion of access 
to East Timor by international humanitarian 
organisations." 
Like the Senators, the House members also advocate a 
negotiated end to the conflict and state that the US 
"srould work together withindmesia, Porwgal and other 
interested participants to help facilitate a peaceful 
and just soluticn to the conf lice'. . . . 
commenting on the letters in an editonal entitled 
"East Tim or's human rights", the Boston Globe (1 
November] said: "Raising an outcry about soviet human 
rights violations ••• takes less political fortitude than 
does insisting that a strategic <illy of Washington stop 
torturing and massacring victims of its dominaticn •••• 
While recognising the strategic ronsideratlons that mold 
us policy toward Incbnesiei, the lawmakers evince the 
political courage to demand an American human rights 
starrlard that wruld he the same for client dictatorships 
and communist regimes." * 
ABC sacks employee for painting East Timor slogans 
A rnrrmt affairs presenter working for the Australian 
B roadcasti.rg Commission has been sacked for plastering 
her own hcuse with slogans calling for Indonesian troops 
to pull out of East 1'imor. 1'he presenter, Ilena 
Eldridge, lives next door to Jo5eph Halim, the 
Indonesian consul in Darwin, and decided to make a 
personal protest against his activities in the city. 
Justifying her dismissal, the ABC claimed that her 
actions "conflict with the public's perception of the 
ABC's integrity and impartiality". 
Eldridgehasdeferredher right to hold perscnal views 
and has criticised her former colleagues for failing to 
Ilena Eldridge's hrnse. [Northern Territory News, 21 
July] 
e,urne to her defence. ''ln a democracy, why can't anyone, 
anywhere, have private political views?" {Northern 
Territory News, 21 July 1988]. . 
It was in Darwin last May that the cornmuruty of East 
Timorese refugees put on a play entitled, "Death .at 
Balibo", aboot the murder of five television journalists 
by Indonesian troops in October 1975. When posters 
announcing the play were seen on display at the Press 
Club in the city, a group of Ind:mesian .TV journalists 
who were visiting the club suddenly decided to pull out 
of their tour of Australia because they felt "offended" 
by the posters. 
Suharto wary about visiting Australia 
During his first visit to Indonesia, Australian Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans renewed a standing invitation from 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke for the Indonesian presiden~ 
General Suharto, to visit Australia. 
Not surprisingly, SUhartois not very enthusiastic but 
left it to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas to explain that 
such a visit could only t.:lke place in the context of 
strengthening, and not disrupting, good bilateral 
relations (Jakarta Post~ 29 October]. 
As Jakarta well knows, any visiting Indonesian 
official is certain to be amfrcnted with denunciations 
of Irdonesian policy on a range of issues, · not least, 
its brutal annexation of East Timor, from Australian 
activists and in particular from Timorese rom munities in 
all the major cities. 
Recent abuses of human rights 
* Five girl sb.ldents at an agriculb.lral college in 
Natarbora, south-west of Dili, were raped and then 
murdered by Incbnesian soldiers on 16 Sept.ember, 
according to Aires da Almeida, an electrical engineer 
who is now a refugee in Australia. He said that the 
incidmt was reported to the authorities by the parents 
of the girls but no action was taken. [The Age, 31 
October] 
* A Freti.linactivist who left East Tirnor with his wife 
in 1985 and has been living in Darwin ever since, has 
been informa:I trat 21 close relatives in East Timor have 
been imprisoned in an attempt to step his political 
activities abroad. 
Jose Gusrnao, who is a cousin of G usmao Xanana, the 
Fretilin leader aoo commander-in-chief of its military 
wing, F alintll, said that the Inoonesian authorities 
detained his 65-year-old mother, three sisters, a 
brother and a sister-in-law, and 15 cousins between the 
ages of 5 and 17 in August this year. He told the press 
that people who had visited EastTimor in July told him 
members of his family had been questioned about how he 
got out of the country. Later, he was told that the 
whale family had been :rounded up and was being held at 
security hea:lquarters in Dill. [The Age, 13 August 1988] 
The two children born to Jose and his wife Maria while 
they were on ihe run from the Indonesian army in East 
Tirnor both died. The first died a few h::1..lrs after birth 
and the seccnd died of malnutrition and malaria. T}iey 
were only able to leave East Timar after paying a 
$25,000 bribe although they had successfully applied to 
migrate to Australia. 
.. 
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Attempt at mediation leads to arrest 
An Italian priest and two East Timorese are reported to 
have been arrested in July this year, after being 
involved in a move to mediate in talks with Fretilin 
leaders in the vicinity of Baucau. The three men are 
Father Eligio Locatteli, a tribal chief, Joaquim 
Guterres and a man idenillied only as Ernesto. 
They, along with a :f;ourth man, Alexio Ximenes, chair 
of the Baucau local assembly, were part of a team said 
to have bem attempting to set up talks between the 
Indonesian authorities and th,e Fretilin leadership. 
According to information made public by Darwin 
parliamentarian, Warren Soowden, an Indonesian red-beret 
platoon had been assigned to protect the group but in 
the event., they tried to capb.lre tie Fretilin team. When 
the Fretilin team arrived, there was an exchange of fire 
and the Fretilin negotiators were able to escape from 
the ambush. [ Northern Territory News, 26 Sey>tember) 
Ernesto and Guterres were then arrested and taken to 
Dili where they were subjected to torture under 
interrogation. Ximenes succeeded in taking refuge at the 
reside?nce of the Bishop in D ili, wh;ile the Italian 
priest was placed under house arres~ 
In J\l,lgus~ an Agence France Press journalist who 
visited East Timor hadrei:orted that the Catholic Church 
in East Timor had for some time been "negotiating the 
surrenqer" of the Fretilin guerrillas. 
Responding to this report., Fretilin's Information 
office· in Lisbon called the news of necptiations for the 
surrenderofthe guerrillas "groundless and absurd". The 
Timorese National Convergence (the alliance between 
Fretilin and the u D T) rejected the idea of the Catholic 
qlUrchplayinga mediating role in East Timor. It wants 
to see all efforts at a solution for East Timor being 
carried out by the UN Secretary-General, Peres de 
Cuellar. [ East Timor News, October 1988] -¢-
East Timorese children 
British Aerospace college opened 
Collaboration between tie leading UK arms manufacturer, 
B riti.sh Aera>pace, an:1 the Indonesian military has been 
taken a step further by the opening of a technical 
college in Malang, Eq.stJava. Named too Army Institute 
of Tecmology, the college was constructed by British 
Aerospace ata cost of E3 million, in collaboration with 
the army's Artillery Weapons Centre. 
British Aen::sp:iee will prOllide eight senior members of 
staff, two of w horn will be on the management. 
'l'he school is located within the oomplex of the Air 
Defence A:tti.llet:y Scrool, which is part of the Artillery 
Education Centre in K arangploso. [Kompas, 12 October]~ 
EAST Tl MOR 
child deaths in D ili: 
parliamentarians call for .inquiry 
During the visit to Lisbon by three parliamentarians 
last June, several East Timorese refugees told the 
mission that many children had died mysteriously after 
going to hospital in Dill for treatment. 
The claims were mad::? p..iblic .in Australia by Tony Lamb, 
meofthe three members of the mission. who is a member 
of the Australian House of Representatives. The 
romplaint was tl:> have been raised during a parliamentary 
debate on human rights abuses in East Timor scheduled 
forOctd:>er, justbefore Foreign Minister Gareth Evans 
begana visittolrrlmesia. Tony Lamb, aloog with Warren 
Snowden, another parliamentarian who also voiced the 
same coocerns, agreed to pcstpone tre debate until after 
the visit. 
Tony Lamb, who is a pharmacist by profession, said 
that when he first heard the claims during meetings with 
refugees, he was sceptical and cross-examined the 
refugees about possible mistaken cbsages or deaths 
throughemern:ic diseases such as amoebic a:rse?.try. "T~ey 
were adamant it was deliberate poisoning, he said. 
He understood that the deaths, which reportedly 
ocrurre:'l at a rate of 15 to 20 a day for ooe period, had 
all ocrurred in one hospital, but East Timorese sources 
in Australia said the deaths occurred in two hospitals. 
Widespread use of Depo Provera challenged 
Tony Lamb also called for an inquiry into a report 
received from the Indonesian Family Planning Institute 
(BK KBN) that.57%of East Timorese women participating in 
the birth control programme are given the Depo Provera 
injection, a loog-term contraceptive with a variety of 
dangerous side-effects. [Sydney Morning Herald, 26 
October] 
The informatioo fran Incbresia came in a reply sent by 
the BK KBN following enquiries from the International 
Planned Parenthood Federatim, after a meeting in 1986 
wren an::ern was e<pressed about implernentatim of birth 
control in East Timor. The BK KB N reply containeo-
statistics for 1986 about the number of birth control 
personnel and public information activities in East 
Timer and gave rornparative figures for Irrlonesia as a 
whole. [E<lSt Timor News, Subject Memo No 4/1988] 
P.owever, the figures about contraceptive methods 
avoide:i making any comparisons, and showed that Depa 
Provera was being used on 57% of partj.clpants, the Pill 
29% and IUD 10%. 
The Lisbon-based group, Peace is Possible .in East 
Tim::>r, has now discovered a rei:ort in D iad.o de Not:icias 
[November 1985] showing that contraceptive methods in 
Indmesia give the following breakdown: the Pill, 65%; 
IUD, 27%; injections, 5%. 
Peace is Possible comments: "This difference of 5% in 
Indonesia and 57% in East Timor intensifies suspicions 
and gives further credibility to the accusatioos of the 
practice of compulsory family planning in East Timor." 
[East Timor News, Monthly Memo no. 8/1988) ~ 
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European Parliament's resolution 
on East Timor 
The following in the subst antive pdrt of the resolution on East (imor, adopted by the European 
Parliament at i t s plenary session on 16 September by 164 votes to 12, with 15 abstentions. The 
resolution followed intense lobbying by Jnaonesia to have the resolution defeated. The .result of the 
voting went virtually unreported in the Indonesian press. 
l. Corrlemns the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia 
and confirms the right of self-aetennination of the 
people of East Timor; 
2. Defends the right of the pecple of East Timor to 
maintain, develop and affirm their cultural, linguistic 
and religious identity derived fran their own history, 
3. Corrlemns the Indonesian policy of denying to 
iooependent foreign visitors the opportunity to examine 
freely conditions in the country and to investigate 
reports of human rights violations; 
4. Calls on the Indonesian Government to carry out the 
promised opening-up of East Timor before the end of 
1988. 
5. Requests the Indonesian Government to allow 
intemational aid and human rights organisations to oome 
to East Timor and to give them complete f.rnedorn of 
movement. · 
6. Calls on the Indonesian Government to permit free 
movement within East Timar and to grant people the right 
to enter and leave the area; 
7. C01.demns the continuing violatioo of human rights in 
East Timor by the Indonesian occupation forces and by 
paramilitary and civil organisations, under the control 
Published by the Parliament.ary Human Rights Group. 
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£2.00, UK and Europe, airmail, £2.SO. 
of t.he Indonesian authorities; 
8. urges the Indonesian Government to corn ply with the 
international prwisions on human rights in East Tim or, 
9. Calls rn tle Member States of the European Community 
to undertake political action with a view to securing a 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timar, as an 
essential precondition for ensuring respect for the 
fundamental rights of the people and for the exercise of 
their right of self-determination, including the right 
to indepe!rlence, ancl t.o support the efforts of the UN 
Secretary General aimed at achieving these objectives; 
10. Calls on the UN Secretary General, in his efforts to 
firrl a solution, to consult not only with Portugal and 
Indonesia but also with the representatives of the 
people of East Timor, the 'Convergencia Nacionalista'; 
11. Calls on all governments in the Community to halt 
the sale bf military equipment to In<bnesia until the 
illegal occupation of East Timor is brought to an end. 
12. Requests the Council to take measures aimed at 
reaching an agreement of cease-fire and enabling a 
referendum to be held after a transitional period, to be 
defined by the interest:OO parties, with the people being 
allowed freedom of choice on the future of East Timor; 
13. Expresses the wish that Portugal, as the 
'administering power', under the provisions of 
internationai law and the Port1Jguese Constitution, 
should be allowed to play an active role fall.ing to it 
to guarantee the effective ex:ercise of the right of 
self-determ:inatioo bf the people of East Timar, and 
supports the efforts made by the Portuguese authorities 
in the directive (sic) of concrete and · viable, 
internationally accepted solutions; 
14. Urges the Foreign Ministers meeting in European 
political CCX)peration t.o maintain a concerted diplomatic 
action in order to guarantee the exercise of the right 
of the pecple of East Timor to self-determination and to 
establish contact with all parties involved in the 
conflict, including representatives of the East Timor 
community, and to report to Parliament on the progress 
of its initiatives; 
15. Calls on all the EEC instib..ttions to bear in mind 
the. present colonial situation in East Timer and the 
terms of this r~sol~tion, when considering relations 
between the EEC and the ASEAN countries. 
16. Requests the Commission to take account of the 
situation in East Timor in its contacts with the 
Indonesian auth:>rities. 
17. Urges the Commission, in cooperation with the 
Portuguese authorities and international competent aid 
.. 
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organisations, to grant adequate and direct aid both in 
East T.imor and in the refugee camps in '.Portugal and 
Australia. 
18, Requests the Commission to give a progess report 
within six months. 
Charges against 
19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution 
to the Council, the Commission, UN organisatioos, the 
conference of noo-aligned nations, the Government of 
Indonesia and the Government of Australia. ~ 
WEST PAPUA 
missions bring angry replies 
Cba.r~ by TheoCbre Frey, the Swiss pilot who fled from 
West Papua in April, tlat missionary air services are 
involved with InCbnesi.an repression in West Papua, have 
been hotly denied by mission leaders. Responding to 
let±erssentbyTAPOL readers and an open letter by Frey 
to the Pope, the missions argue that transporting 
Indonesian army personnel and cargo to remote 
communities does not aid Jakarta's military OCC\lpation 
of West Papua. . 
The AMA reply comes in a letter from J.M. Verstegen, 
director of the rompany, while the reply to Frey's open 
letter to the :Pq:>e comes from H •. F .M. Munninghoff OFM, 
the Bishop of Jayqpura. 
Frey was a pilot with the Associated Mission Aviation, 
AM A, an organisation run by the four catholic dicx::eses 
in West Papua to supply their mission outposts. Before 
fleeing to Australia with his family, Frey amassed data 
which showed that, on many routes, at least half or more 
of the passengers and cargo carried by AM A were for the 
Indonesian government or military [see TAPOL bulletin, 
No. 89). Frey had observoo for himself the destructive 
impact of Indmesian rule on the people of West Papua, 
and became increasingly critical of the apparent 
complicity of the missions. 
Now, the director of AMA and the Bishop of Jayapura 
have acci:lsed Frey of lying about the role of the 
missions in West Papua. Alth:>ugh AMA doesn't usually 
differentiate military from civilian cargo in its 
statiStics, Verstegen says in a letter to a Bulletin 
reader that the proportioo of military cargo is very 
small. He says that for 1987, figures of the military 
share were rerorded. They amounted to 4,337 kilos in 
military personnel and cargo which accounted for only 
0.33% of the total. The Bishop also gave a similar 
breakdown for January to May 1988, showing that AMA 
flights for the military and the police amounted to only 
3 full charters plus 691 kilos and 6 passengers. 
AskedbyTAPOL tooommenton these figures, Frey said 
in response to the Bishop's letter: "Only in the Paniai 
region alone, I flew more than this in that time." He 
also disputed the AMA 1987 figures, saying that during 
1987, AMA flights to Komopa, a small place near Danau 
Paniai, amounted in total to 34,484 kila>, of which only 
18% was for the mission. Nearly 72%, or 24,828 kgs was 
for the governmen~ including the armed forces and the 
police. "I myself flew a lot of armed military people, 
rice for the military and all other things the military 
people need over there." !Frey's letter to TAPOL, 14 
October 1988] 
Missions' role in West Papua 
AMA defends its role on the assumption that the much 
larger quantity of InCbnesian government passengers arrl 
cargo it carries contribute nothing to military 
repression in west Papua. This is far from the truth. 
Many civilian officials in Indonesia are former military 
officers, arrl routinely conduct business for the armed 
.. 
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forces. Moreover, all levels of civilian administration 
a re closely linked to the equivalent level of the 
mili tary, and this is especially so in west Papra where 
civilian officials must allow for the security 
requirements of the army. Anyone on official business 
for the g01ernment .in West Papua is likely, directly or 
indirectly, to be on business for the military as well. 
I n resporrling tD Frey's criticisms, the missions have 
shown themselves tD be surprisingly naive about thei r 
role in West Papua. The past twenty years are replete 
with examples of the destructive impact of missions on 
isolatedtribalpeoples. West Papua is home to some of 
the most untouched and therefore vulnerable tribal 
pecples left in the world, and virtually all their 
contact with the outside world comes initially through 
the missions. Yet in their replies, AMA and the Bishop 
of Jayapura show no appreciation of tre responsibility 
the missions not to allow this special pa:>i,tion to be 
abused. Many of tie missionaries are uncbubtedly 
sinc:l:?reanddadicated prople who have brought worthwhile 
improvements to the lives of their West Papuan hosts, 
but this is not the case wi th rre Indonesian cpvernment. 
Inoonesian policy has brought untold misery to west 
Papuan communities through::mt tie country, from abuses 
and killings by soldiers to the expropriation of their 
land and the suppression of their traditicnal customs. 
In areas like the Asmat, 'opened up' by the missions but 
now overrun by Indonesian economic and military 
interests, tre welfare of the local pecple has declined 
at a horrifying rate. The racism and outright physic.al 
abuse of West Papuans by Indonesian officials has been 
noti::rl by many observers besides Theodore Frey, and the 
government is bent on forcing West Papua to bocome a 
docile Indonesian province through the obliteration of 
its indigenous culb.l re. 
Bishop uAMA always :ready to serve 
government and armed forces" 
None of this ought to be news to the missions, which 
have first-hand experience of Indonesia's treatment of 
its colony. It is extraordinary, then, that the Bishop 
of J.ayaJ?ura. should have ~ttacked Theodore Frey by 
stating rn his letter that AM A is ready, as far as it 
is able, to se~ the governmmt, the armed forces and 
the police, including replacing members of the armed 
forces and the police in tre interior." ["A HA - sejauh 
mampu - rela melaljd.ni Peme.rintah A 8 RI /Palisi, termasuk 
penggantian tugas anggota-a.nggot.a A 8 RI/Palisi di pos-pos 
pendalaman."] 
To date, the missions in West Papua have been subject 
to little international scrutiny while pilots in a 
position to know a great deal have chosen to keep silent 
for fear of losing their jobs. But now the missions have 
been stung by a pilot who stepped out of line and 
decided to expose AMA activities in support of the 
military rulers. Still worse, he is armed with a mass of 
figures to back his charges. If the missions wish to 
keep a better image than some of their South American• 
counterparts, they will need to do more than keep quiet 
about corrlitions in West Papua under Indcnesian rule in 
order to preserve their relations with the Indonesian 
government; and they will certainly 02ed to review their 
practice of brin:;Jing Indoo.esian cpvemment and military 
personnel into remote tribal commw1ities. If Indonesia 
is able to use tre infrastrucblre and trust built up by 
the missions in trese areas tD 'Incbnesianise', and thus 
destroy the indigenous peop les, the missions will be no 
less r espons ible for the consequences. ~ 
( 
Theo and Martha Frey 
Mass arrests in West Papua 
According to news reaching TA POL just as this Bulletin 
was going to press, 145 peopl~ were arrested in 
September in Jayapura, the capital of West Papua. All 
those arrested are Papuans and consist mostly of civil 
servants and army and police personnel. 
In addition 10 students at Cendrawasih University .in 
Jayapura were 'kidnappe:l' by the security forces at the 
same time. This expression usually means that the 
victims were taken t.o an unkmwn destination and 
relatives have been unable tD ascertain their place of 
detention. All ten sb1dents originate from Sorong 
district in the western part of west Papua, known as 
Bird's Head. They are all said to be associates of Mecky 
Salc;ss. a. , an OPM leader who is also from the Soron9 
region. ~ 
Continued from page 1 
third world countries, under a programme mis-named 
'social forestry'. 
The labourneedsoftheprojectin MeraUk.e may rely on 
the cheap lal:x:Jurof transmigrants whose sites have been 
so notoriously unsuccessful, or the importation of more 
Javanese, further marginalising the tribal people. 
Pulp factories are renown for the waste problems they 
cause, polluting local waterways or nearby coastal 
waters, depending on where the factory is sited. 
The Scott Paper Company is the world's largest 
producer of household paper products, primarily tissues 
and paper rowels, as well as industrial paper. It has 29 
plants and mills in the US as well as manufactllring 
operations in seventeen other countries. In 1983, the 
company's sales amounted to $2,450 million. 
From sources in Indonesia, we have learnt that the 
felling .. of eucalyptus trees has already begun in the 
area, urrler a concession held by PT Silvana Agung 
Lestn.ri. /\lthough these operations are illegal, they 
have the approval of the loca,l forestry bureau. 
TAPO~ recently wrote to Scott Paper in Philadelphia, 
express111g concern over the project. We plan to launch 
an action, along with other organisations, to halt this 
damaging project which wi ll devour the forests of 
Merauke and trample on the customary rights of the 
tribal owners of the land. ~ 
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The Golkar congress 
The national congre s s of Go1k.ar, the government part y which now claims a membership of 32 million Loo~ Pl~ce fn the fas t week of October. Many political observers expected a battle between the tw~ 
ma1or r~1cuons but at the last moment, the conflict was defused Dy President Suharto who seems as 
dete1·m1n ea as ever to continue to rule Indonesia. 
A ~onth before the convention started, it was widely 
b~lieved ~t General Sudhannono, the newly appointed 
V.ice-P:res.ire.ntofthe Reµ:tblicand also General Chairman 
of Golkar since 1983, would be re-elected chairman. 
Sudharmono had made clear his wish to remain in the 
post, and President Suharto had given the green light, 
by stating that he had no objection to the vice-
presidency and Golkar chairmanship being combined. 
But t-.hings moved very fast in September and October, 
in a way that proved fatal for the political career of 
Strlharmooo. Although a gereral himself, he l-as never led 
a military unit, having made his career in the 
bureaucracy. As State Secretary from 1983 to 1988, a 
position comparable to chief-of-staff of the White 
House, Sudharmonowascorrectly seen as Suharto' s main 
instrument in running the huge state apparatus, while 
Gereral Murdani, commarrling the troops, represented the 
other wing, the armed forces (ABRI). 
SudharmC110's ascendaocy as Vice-President last March 
was greeted withdismayandangerby the military and it 
was clear that se~ral groups intre army were ready to 
go to any lengths to prevent a further boost for the 
SUdharmoro grcup. It was Lieutenant-General Harsudiono 
Hartas, the powerful chief-of-staff for social and 
political affairs, . who played a leading part in 
bringing down &ldharmcno. Under his guidance, colonels 
and lieutenant-colonels were 'dropped' at provincic-il 
Golkar board elections, taking over as chairman or 
secretary in many places. By early October, it was clear 
that, l}ad Si.ldharmono pressed ahead with his bid for re-
electirn1, he would have had a rough ride in the congress 
and would have faced difficulties later with many 
provincial boards. 
In the end President Suharto had no alternative but to 
ditch his loyal friend who had now become a very weak 
Link in his power game. Instead, the job went to an 
outsider, General Wahono. In l ate 1965, during the 
military takeover, Wahono was one of Suharto's close 
aides, as assistant for operations at Kostrad, the army 
strategic command which was used so effectively by 
Suharto to seize power. Aft.er a successful military 
career, W ahono moved into the bureaucracy, becoming 
director-general of the excise and t.ari.ffs directorate 
ard then amoassaror to Burma. He then became governor of 
East Java and in October this year, took over as 
Inspector-General for Development which handles the 
funding of so-called presidential projects, with an 
office in Bina Graha, the President's office. 
Although not a high flyer, Wahono probably realises 
that he was chosen by Suharto to bridge the gap between 
the field generals and the generals in the bureaucracy. 
In the event, Wahono's election went smoothly. 
Sudharmono officially stepped down and tre congress, in 
one voice, acclaimed warono as their new leader. 
A new course for Golkar? 
After the structilral chanqes introduced when 
The new and the old. General Wahono (left} and General 
Sudharmono. [Tempo, 15 October 1988] 
Sudharmono took over as chairman in 1983, there have 
officially been three components in Golkar, the A 
component (ABRJ), the B component (the bureaucracy, 
which mrens the civil servants' union, Korpri) and the G 
component (Golkar). The latter has always been the 
weakest, ronsistingasitdoes of civilians whose simple 
credo is: if you can't beat them (ie. the military) 
join them. The B oom,ponent, hea~d by Interior Minister: 
General (ret'd) Rudini., has always been top-heavy with 
military, and invariably takes the side of the A 
component 
Under Slrlharmono, strenuous attempts were made to 
strengthen the civilian component through so-called 
cadre-building. Golkar now claims to have nine million 
cadres whose main task is to mobilise the mass of people 
to vote for Golkar at elections. Up to the time of the 
1988 congress, these cadres were under the oontrol of 
local, civilian Golkar functionaries . 
The oongress is very likely to lead to the phasing out 
ofthecoursemap~outby Sudharmono. The militarised 
leadership of many local boards will mean putting these 
~adre~ unde7 military control and discipline. Army 
mtelltgence is well aware that with unemployment rife 
and social problems mounting, these cadres, if let 
loose, could encourage all kinds of demands and, 
wittingly or unw~ttingly, ignite social unrest. In 
charge of putting Golkar back where it belongs, in the 
lap of the army, is General Harsudiono Hartas. As chi.ef-
of-staff for social . and political affairs, he is in 
charge of giving army officers civilian assignments. He 
has bren mOllingofficers into Golkar for several months 
acting like a shadow chairman gradually elbowin~ 
Sudharmono out. 
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Bulwark against the PKI 
Army spokesmen have been at pains to stress, in the 
past few months, that Golkar was set up in the early 
1960s for the sole purpose of countering the PK I. The 
constant harping on this theme can only mean that many 
in army circles believe that Golkar, urrler Sudharmono, 
has been infiltrated by pro-PK! elements. Indeed, in the 
months p~theo::ngress, Golkar faced a number of 
damaging revelations with tie urearthing of alleged~ 
PKI members or sympathisers among the upper crust of 
functionaries. Effurts to discredit Golkar went so far 
as to include a chorus of charges about Sudharmono's own 
early flirtation with pro-communist organisations. The 
charge, made obliquely over and over again, that he was 
a 'pinko', referring apparently to a period in his youth 
when he was a member of the PKI's youth organisation 
Pesindo, became so persistent that he took the 
unprecedented step, shortly before the congress, of 
calling a press conference to deny this. 
Bereft.of his Golkar job, Sudharmooo, so recently seen 
as one of the regime1s most powerful figures, is now 
being compared to the former vice-president, retired 
general, Umar Wil:ahalikusumah, wh::>was never more than a 
deooration. In Jakarta, this is being called the 'Umar-
isation' of Sudharmono. Many Sudharmmo loyalists have 
also been removed from Golkar's central board, 
strengthening the A component, and reversing the trend 
which Sudharmono introduced, the so-called 
civilianisation of Golkar. 
The significance of W ahono' s 
appointment 
There a:veseveral conclusions that can be drawn from 
Wahooo'sappointmentas General Chairman. First, it is 
th::>ught likely that he will take over as vice-president 
during SUharto's next term, 1993-98, a formality that 
means replacing one Suharto loyalist by another. Neither 
S .. ldharmrnonor Wah:no p::ssess any power base within the 
armed forces and have displayed no particular ambitions, 
other than serving Sunarto loyally. It appears that the 
option of using the vice-presidency as the stepping-
stone to the presidency has been put back lUltil ~e rext 
century, assuming Suharto lives that long and is not 
ousted in the meantime. 
At 63, w aoono is older than Sudharmono and is an 
unlikely crown prince. Yet,, unnamed generals are now 
being quol:Erl as saying that., should Suharto be unable to 
complete his present term (call it the 'slip-in-t.he-
bathroom' scenario), w ahoro will be the only acceptable 
replacement, not Sudharmono, even though he is, 
accon:ling to the Constitutioo, first in line. 
There are no signs at present that Suharto is 
preparing a yolil1ger man in the army as his successor. 
Like Franco in Spain and the Ceausescu dynasty in 
Romania, Suharto and his eJ<terrled family have become so 
intertwired with state eoonomic interests that when he 
steps down or dies, he will need to be sure that his 
successor protects the family's c...'O,tporate wealth. 
Developments following the ousting of Marcos and Chun 
Doo-hwan can only have reinforced Suharto's conviction 
thattheonlysafesuccessor would be romebody from his 
family. 
None of his three sons entered the army and are all 
successful businessmen. Only his sen-in-law, Lieutenant-
Colonel Prabowo, the son of Professor Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo, is following a military career. He is 
currently head of the private palace guard, and as such, 
is certainly being groomed by Suharto for more important 
things. He is in his late thirties, too young by E.ast 
Asian standarrls to be plunged into politics. If, as some 
people believe, Prabowo is the ch~en crown prince, it 
could be another ten years before positive moves in that 
directirn are taken, al ways assuming that nothing else 
happens in between. -¢-
Re-registration of former political prisoners 
The Indonesian press continues to report the on-going 
re-registration of former political prisoners, with 
figures being published over and over again about the 
number of people in the different categories. Some of 
these reports suggest that Golkar and the armed forces 
are vying with each ether to warn local officials that 
they are not doing enough to control communist suspects. 
Parliamentarians who have visited the regions have 
criticised local administrations for their inadequacies 
in keeping tabs on ex-prisoners. The Golkar members of 
Commissicn II complained, for instance, that s,ooo 
mernbersofbanredor;ganisations reoorded in the district 
of Pati in 1977 were no longer recorded in 1982, and a 
sirnilarnumber"almostdisappeared' .in Boyolali. Another 
CX)mplaint was that former prisoners in Central Java were 
issuad travel passes witlx:>ut recording the destination. 
Elsewhere, they were issued ider\tity q;i.l::IJ.s improperly. 
The MPs also reported .apathy amongp~le living in 
the neighbourhood of e:x:-prisoners,. particularly in the 
larger cities. There was lack of awareness of" the need 
to encourage people to control former political 
prisoners living in their mid$t. 
The armed forces grrup complained of w.eak s llJ?ervision 
of ex-prisooers in Jakarta as .a result of their "high 
degree of mobility'', their efforts to <;:over.their tracks 
and obtain new identity cards, while n~ighbourhood 
associations were insufficiently aware of the need to 
keep the ex-prismers ttn1er oontrol. (suara Pemba.ruan, 6 
September] 
Reports like this reveal that there lias been no let-up 
in the campaign to keep up the pressure on ex-prisoners 
and anyone suspected of furmer communist sympathies.I,( 
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More executions 
Two more prisoners who were sentenced to death twenty 
years acp for their involvement in the events of October 
1965 have been executed. The executions took place near 
Jakarta on the night of 15 October. As with previous 
executions, there was no official announcement,. nor 
would the authorities confirm or deny reports tliat the 
executions had taken place. But after protests in 
Holland, the executions were reported in two Jakarta 
weeklies, Tempo and Editor. 
The two men are: 
Sukardjq sixty-one years old, and 
Gijadi Wignyosuharjo, sixty years old. 
Trey were bct:h members of the Cakrabi.rawa Pal.ace Guam 
at tl.e time of their arrest. Suk.ardjo was arrested on 5 
October 1965. He was evenb.lally tried by the Jakarta 
Military Tribunal in March 1969 and found guilty of the 
murder of Major-General Pandjaitan, one of six generals 
kidnapped and murdered on 1 October 1965. 
Giyadi was arrebi:Edon4 October 1965 and sentenced in 
April 1968 for "having pulled the trigger" on General 
Yani on 1 October. 
They are the first to be executed of eight members of 
the PQ!ace Guard who were sentenced to death. Their 
executions place the lives of the other six men in 
extreme danger. 
EEC states call for no more · executions 
Thel2 member states of the European Community took 
joint action against the executions. Replying to a 
letter from TA.POL sent as soon as news of the 
executiooshad been rereived, the Foreign Office wrote: 
"We too were alarmed to hear about the executions of 
Sukardjo and W ignjosuhardjo. The Twelve countries of the 
£ l' have made anew demarche, voicing their deep regret 
and disappointment at the executions and appealing to 
the Indonesian authorities to abstain from further 
executions on humanitarian grounds." 
Left to right: Liem s.L., TAPOL, ti.S. Diredja, for 
Indonesian refugees, and W. Jurg, Dutch Indlnesia 
Cornmtttee, showing the list of death-sentence prisoners, 
at a press a:nference. [De waarheid, 27 Octnber 1988] 
In Indonesia, the executions were condemned by H.J.C 
Princen, chair of the League for the Defence of Human 
Rights: "Executing a death sentence so long after the 
verdict is a violation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 5 of which prohibits cruel, 
degrad.in:J and inhuman treatment. To live for so long in 
uncertainty is an exceptionally inhuman form of 
torture," he said. 
Amnestyinternaticnal has written to President Suharto 
deploring the executions and expressing concern for the 
safety of all those silll under sentence of death. 
Jakarta tries to explain 
The two executions took place two weeks before Ruud 
Lubbers, the Dutch Prime Minister, went on an official 
visit tb Indonesia. As a result of widespread protest in 
Hollandandofmanyquestions in Parliament,. Lubbers was 
forced to agree to protest aboot the executioos during 
his visit to Indonesia. 
The many judicial murders perpetrated by Jakarta in 
the past four years have aroused strong feelings :in 
Holland ever s:ince Mohamad Munir, the trade union 
lead=r, was executed in May 1985 after more than a 
decade witrout any etecutic:ns taking place. In 1980, the 
Dutch Foreign Minister, van der Klauw, was given an 
assurance by the Ind:uesian government tlut no further 
executions would take place. At the time, the lawyer 
Buyung Nasution warned against giving credence to any 
such assurance, as long as the death sentences. had not 
been rommulted. His words of caution have been 
rompletely vindicated. 
One view widely held in Holland is that Jakarta 
carried out the latest executions just before the 
Lubbers visit in order to show its contempt for 
mternational opinion. In any case, Suharto had every 
reasm to be sure that the Dutch government would not 
allow the politically-motivated murder of two men tD 
stand in the way of expanding Dutch commercial and 
investment interests in Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, it was tre campaign in the Netherlands 
that forced government leaders to speak publicly about 
the exeC'Utions. There were even attempts to make the 
long delay samd like an act of humanity, not a cruel 
act of eecuting men who had spent most of their adult 
lives in prison. 
In his meeting with Prime Minister Lubbers, President 
Suharto said tlat the two men had bem given a long time 
to live "in order to give them a chance to show an 
expression of regret. They were executed because they 
--.. 
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did not regret their deE.'ds." (Jakarta Post, 1 November 
1988] 
But Foreign Minister Ali Alatas had a different 
explanation. Acrording to him, the executions were 
delayed ba:::ause the appeals p:ri::x::roure is time-consuming 
and Indooesia does not have enough judges and court 
officials to hamle cases quickly. ''To describe this as 
a major human rights problem, to call it shocking (the 
word used publicly by Prime Minister Lubbers) and 
inhuman is a bit far-fetched. It is all the work of some 
so-called human rights NG Os, whipping up an anti-
Indooesia campaign." Asked whether it was not too much 
for~ men to have wait.ed more than twenty years on 
death row for their clemency plea to be answered, Alat.as 
said: ''It wasn't only the clemency plea. More evidence 
was needed from the men in other cases, some of them 
very far from Jakarta, in Medan, Bali and Sulawesi." 
[Interview on AVRO televisioJ'\. 2 November] 
As for the Indooesian ambassador in The Hague, he 
tried t.o put a brave face on it: "The <;PVemment behaved 
very humanely indeed by waiting twenty years be£ore 
carrying out the death sentence." [ Editor, 29 October} 
Two Muslims also executed? 
According to Amnesty International, two Muslim death 
sentence prisoner may also have been executed. One is 
Abdullah Uma~ 39 years old, who was given a life 
sentence in February 1985; the sentence was later 
changed to death, on appeal by the prosecutor. The other 
is BambangS.i.spoyo, also 39 years ol°* who was sentenced 
to death in June 1985. 
Amnesty believes that Abdullah Umar may have been 
6'ecuted .in April this year arrl Bambang Sispoyo may have 
been executed in June or July. Both men were being held 
at Nusakembangan Prison Island, in Central Java. [AI 
document. ASA 21/17 /88] 
Regarding these two cases, the Foreign Office wrote in 
its letter to TA POL: "The Indonesians have not yet 
confirmed the executions of Abdullah Umar and Bambang 
Sispo:yo, althcugh it is generally believed that these 
did take plc.o:! abrut two months ago. We have asked our 
Embassy to seek further in.formation urgently." 
Eleven men still await their fate 
Following the deaths in prison during the past year of 
.Rasw ad and Suw andi, who had both been under sentence of 
death for many years, there remain eleven men under 
sentence of death, all of whom have been in prism for 
very many }'ears. Four were leading members of the 
Communist Party (PKI); six were members of the 
Cakrabiraw a Palace Guard and the seventh was in the air 
force. They are: 
* Ruslan Wijayasastra, 71, a member of the P KI Central 
Committee and a leader of the Peasants' Union (BTI). 
Arrested in February 1969 and sentenced in April 1972. 
* Suk~ 6 0, chair of the PK I's :youth organisation, 
Perni.rla Rakyatarrlon the PKI Central Committee. Arrested 
in July 1968 and sentenced in March 1971. 
* Iskarrlar Subekti., 67, a member of the PK! Central 
Committee and of its foreign affairs department. 
Arrested in February 1969 and sentenced in March 1971. 
*Asep SUryaman, 62, a member of the PKI's 'special 
bureau', alleged tn have been an intelligence unit which 
infiltrated the army. Arrested in September 1971 and 
sentenced in 1975. 
* SatarSuryantD, 57, Cakrabirawa. Arrested in October 
1965 and sentenced in April 1971. 
* I Bungkus, 61, Cakrabhawa. Arrested in October 1965 
and sentenced in July 19 71. 
* !:W:oro, 60, Cakrab.irawa. Arrested in October 1965 and 
sentenced in October 1970. 
* Athanasllls Buarg, 49, Cakrabi:rawa. Arrested in October 
1965 and sentenced in November 1969. 
* Simon Petrus Soleiman, 60, Cak.rabirawa. Arrested in 
October 1965 and sentenced in November 1969. 
* Norbertus Rohayan, 49, Cakrabirawa. Arrested in 
October 1965 and sentenced in November 1969. 
* Marsudi, 53, a sergeant-major in the air force. Date 
of arrest net. known, probably late 1965. Sentenced in 
1976. ~ 
Continued from page 24 
in from Java. 
According to official figures, at least 40,000 
transmigrants from Java were re-settled in the Moluccas 
from 1979 to 1985 but the figure is probably much 
higher. In May this year, Moluccan villagers were said 
to have been respcnsible for the deaths of nine Javanese 
transmigrants in Riring, Ceram, following a land 
dispute. 
Names of the detainees 
Several of those arrested are thought to be leaders of 
the old RMS movement. They are: Michel Watl:i.mena, 67, a 
funnerdiaitinanofthe RMS; Simon Werinussa, arrestedln 
K ariu, Haruku Island, as well as his two sons, Luis, a 
policeman, and Butje, a lawyer; Jolm Toumahq alleged 
vice-chairman of the RMS and secondary school teacher; 
and Ju,rn.is Pasanea, 60, who was sentenced to 14 years 
imprisooment inthel970s on RMS-related charges. Along 
with Pasanea, David Kaihenq. 58, and his t.wQ sons, 
Martin, 32, and Samuel, :28, were also arrested. one. of 
the detainees, Pieter Nassarany, 34, a secondary-school 
reaclerfrom Piruon Ceram Isl.a,rd, was apparently ou his 
way to Holland when arrested by the military police in 
Arnbon on 13 July. ¥ 
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Kopkamtib gives way to Bakorstanas 
Kopkamtib, the Operati01al Command for the Restoration 
of Seairicy and Order, the first creation of General 
Suharto as he rose to power in October 1965, has now 
been disbanded. The Command was set up to wipe out the 
InCbresian Communist Party which was a major social and 
political force at the time. over the years, it has 
served the Suharto regime as its key instrument to 
destroy political opponents. It has been used not only 
against alleged communist suspects and student 
activists, but also and increasingly in the past decade, 
against Muslim preachers and activists. 
The strucb.rre of Kopkamtib 
Kopkamtib was a target of government critics as an 
uncx:mstitutional body with unlimited powers to detain 
and arrest pa:>ple. Said at first to be 'temporary', it 
remained in existence for nearly a quarter of a century. 
The military are still in control, under Bakorstanas, 
Kopkamtib's reincarnation. [Jakarta Post. 6 October] 
It never had an existence separate fran the army and its 
operations were carried out by the army's command 
structure. Army regicnal commanders bore the additional 
title of Laksusda, meaning 'special regional executive 
officer', who carried out the instructions of the 
Kopkamtih commarrler. The word Laksusda became part of 
the language of repression, referring both to the 
officer himself and his corps of agents swooping down on 
suspects from whichever part of the political spectrum 
currently being targetted. 
Since 1965, there have been the following changes in 
the leadership of Kopkamtib's command structure: 
2 October 1965 
Commander, General Suharto 
March 1969 
Commander, General Maradan Panggabean 
Depucy Commander, General Soemitro 
March 1971 
Commander, General Soemitro 
Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Sudomo 
Early 1974 
Commander, General Suharto 
Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Sudomo 
March 1978 
Commander, Admiral Sudomo 
Chief-of-Staff, General Yoga Sugama (till 1980) 
Chief-of-Staff, General w ijoyo Sujono, 1980-1983 
March 1983 - September 1988 
Commander, General Benny Murdani 
Suharto becomes commander again 
The new agency is called Bako:rstanas, short for Badan 
Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional, or 
Coordination Board to Help Solidify National Stability. 
As the name suggests, it is a 'board' not a •oommand' 
with a 'chairman' instead of a 'commander'. 
But, to quote Admiral Sudomo, "the Board will be 
directly under the President. It will be I'()fl-structural, 
with the task of giving advice to the President." 
[Tempo, 12 November] What this means is that Suharto is 
now, again, the commander, as he was in the late 1960s 
and the mid 1970s. 
'!he permanent members of Board are the chiefs-of-staff 
of the army, navy and air force and the chief of police, 
the armed forces chief-of-st.aff for social and political 
affairs, the secretaries of the three minister-
coordinators, and senior-ranking officials from the 
Attorney-General's Office and Bakin, the intelligence 
coordinatioo. board. The chairman of the Board is the 
armed forces commander-in-chief, General Try Sutrisno. 
The Board will be served by a secretariat which is 
composed of virtually the entire general staff of the 
armed forces. 
The c csmetic nature of the change is barely coocealed. 
It will have its offioe at armed forces headquarters and 
will be at the pinnacle of a network of regional boards 
called Bakorstanasda wrose com~itions will mirror the 
central board, with the additicn of military commanders 
and police chiefs at district and sub-district levels. 
The Bakorstanasda will be under the chairmanship of the 
regional military commanders. • 
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Bow Bakorst.anas will work 
Although the Boord and its secretariat are so top-
heavy with military personnel, G cneral 'I'ry Sutrisno 
declared, after the Board's first meeting: ''It is not a 
military organisation but a non-structural 
organisation". He also said that the Laksusda will cease 
to exist. 
However, this should not be taken as meaning that the 
army has relinquished its role as the security force. 
What has happened is that the additional layer of 
Kopkamti.b and Laksusda which exercise:i specia 1 powers 
vested in the army, has been removed; these special 
powers will now be vested directly in the hands of the 
anny witrout any intervening agency. Hence. Bakorstanas 
nee:is no command structllre of its own and can afford to 
describe itself as "non-structural". 
When asked whether the elimination of the Laksusda 
post function would mean officers in the regions losing 
some of their powers, General Sutrisno said: "Not at 
all. It is our noble (sic) intention to make sure th~t 
each institution arrl functionary should perform. ~el.r 
proper function. '!'he regional and. lo~l mill~ry 
comrnards are going to have their territorial functions 
enhanced." 
Regardingpowersofdetenti.onandarrest, he explained 
that criminal cases woold be left to the police and the 
public prosecutors to han:Ue. (This has indeed always 
been the position.) "But if the seeds of a case could 
lead to disrupt.ion of stability, then of course, other 
security forces will take charge." While he was not 
specific about who these other securicy forces were, he 
could ooly have meant the army. Asked who would handle 
the "latent communis~' danger until now handled by 
Kopkamtib or Laksusda, Sutrism said that "Bakorstanas 
will have special staff to deal with th:i.s. They will 
coordinate implementation of this task with government 
departments and the public, while within the armed 
forces, the territorial apparatus will deal with this as 
weu.•· 
Although Sutrisno said it would take time for 
regulations guiding the new system to be drafted, he 
made it clear that some K opkamtib regulations would 
c..."Ontinue to be used. "Those that are relevant will 
remain in force; some will need their terminology to be 
amenood and those rn longer relevant will be revoked." 
[Kompas, 11 November] * 
The 'clean-self' and 
'clean-environment' witch-hunt 
Admiral Sudomo, one-time commarrler of the security 
agency, Kopkamtib, and now Minister-Coordinator for 
Social and Political Affairs, has recently been trying 
hard to clear up what he considers to be widespread 
confusion over the applicability of the criteria now 
used to prevent people from seeking employment on the 
groun:ls of their own or their family's alleged 
involvement in the so-called 'coup attempt' of 1965 or 
for alleged membership of or association with the PKI, 
alleged to have master-minded the 'coup attempt'. 
For years now, as we have frequently reported, people 
ha~ been required tn attest not only to their own 'non-
involvemene or cleanliness, but also to prove that no-
one in their 'environment', that is to say, blood 
relatives and in-laws, was involved either. Hence the 
currency of the expressions 'bersih diri' or clean-self, 
and 'bersih lingkungau' or clean-environment. 
But the use of the 'bersih-lingkungan' criterion c.ame 
under fire from Interior Minist.er, General Rud.ini, 
following a spate of accusations levelled against people 
in positions withingovenunent or in Gollcar because of 
family ti.es with former prismers or communist suspects. 
He rornplaimrl of"unwarranted and unna:essary excesses". 
He disli.ke:i the term 'clean-environment' and said both 
terms had arisen from the public itself. 
At the heart of the present fuss is the fact that many 
aspiring Golkar functionaries are now discovering that 
'unclean' persons in their family circles are becoming 
an obstacle to their ambitions. No-one questions the 
system of discrimination itself and the witch-hunting 
which it has eng:mdered. No-one has rome to the defence 
of the real victims, the ex-prismers and their close 
relatives who have for many years borne the political 
stigma of 'involvemene. 
Both Su<bmo and R OOini insist that there is m mention 
in any of tre regulations in force of the terms 'bersih-
diri' and 'bersih-lingkungan'. Nevertheless, it is 
widely koown that 'bersih-diri' certificates known by 
the initials SKBD (Surat l(eterangan Bei:sih Oiri) and 
Surat K. et.erangan Bersih lingk.ungan certificates, known 
as SK BL, are required for people applying for many jobs. 
These certificates were also required of. all can:lidates 
nominated for the 1987 general elections. 
With the help of recent statements by Sudomo, it is 
now possible to e><amine the origins of this policy. 
The orig.ins of 'clean-environment' 
In a statementthat was widely reported in the press 
[see Kompas andJakartaPost9 September, for example], 
Su<'bmo explained tha~ up until 1980, discriminatory 
practices againsttheemploymentof ·~ta.pols' or, more 
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broadly, 'ex-PKI' people, were based on a Kcpkamtib 
decree requiting all persons applying for jobs in the 
government sector or in 'vital' private enterprises to 
have 'non ... involvementcertificates' confirming that they 
were not involved in tlY3 alleged 1965 'c.'Oup attempt' nor 
Tempo, 12 November 1988 
were they (alleged) members of the now-banned PKI or 
associ9,ted organisations. 
Modificaticns in the 'non-involvement certificate' 
regulations wece introduced in 1975, and in 1976, a 
gcwemmmt regulation stipulated that only persons never 
:involved in movements in oppcsition to Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitntion could become civil servants. 
According to a regulation introduced in January 1980, 
'non-involvement certificates' were no longer required 
for persons who were under 12 years of age in 1965, it 
being recognised that they "were too young to know 
anything" at the time. These modifications "did not 
lessen the need to carry out 'mental and ideological' 
screening of anyone applying for jobs with the 
goveniment or in the 'vital' private sector," said 
suoomo. 
In June 1982, Kopkamtib issued an Implementary 
Insti;uction [Pet.unjuk Pelak sanaan] which stated that the 
screening of applicants for jobs in the state sector 
should "include an assessment of the applicant with 
regard to environment (lingkungan) concerning personal 
identity and family backgroW1d, including place of 
residence and social links". SUdomo has now speltoutin 
detail the nature ·of this family background assessmenb 
"This assessment includes, among others, the famillJ 
environment, siblings, dominant or ve'I:IJ influential 
relations influencing the person's outlook, behaviour 
and mental-ideological attitude as the result of family 
ties, feelings of gratitude, intimacy, similarity of 
aspirations and outlook, and so on. lncluded in dominant 
relations are: parents' t.ies with their children, 
parents-in-law's ties with their sons or daughters-in-
law1 grandparents with grandchildren whom they have 
brought up, uncles, aunts, older brothers oi; sistei;s who 
paid foi; t.he person's education, anyone who supported 
the person for a reasonably long period of time; wives 
with husbands and the reverse; the specific nature of 
the person's social surcoundjngs which may have colouced 
the persons's attitude. 
"This is what subsequenUy became popularllJ known as 
'bersih-lingkungan' and 'bersih-diri', althougl1 these 
terms were not used in the 1982 document." 
Sudomo rec:ognised the need for these implementary 
instructions to be "revitalised', and has since promised 
that new regulations regarding 'bersih-diri' and 
•bersih-lingkungan' will soc:n be issued. For members of 
the armed forces, a totally 'clean' family background 
will continue to be unconditional, he said. But for 
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tmse in government service or seeking jobs with the 
government, screening of the family background would 
continue to be tie same as for the armed forces although 
there wruldrow begreateremphasis on the person's own 
character. Each case would be oonsidered 01 its merits. 
This screening also applies to anyone presently 
working in, or applying for jobs in, state enterprises, 
anyone in the teaching profession, the political parties 
and Golkar (not clear whether he means functionaries or 
members as well), the press, puppeteers (dalang), 
village heads, legal aid bureaus and the clergy. 
'l'o avoid unnecessai:y public recriminations, he asked 
members of the pub lie to report "suspicious or unusual" 
family ties of present or aspiring government employees 
to the authorities so that they could be "properly 
investigated". 
"Once a communist...." 
A few weeks afrer making this statement, Sudomo denied 
that the modifications in the screening process which 
would roan be introduced meant that the government is 
"getting soft'' on communists. "Even though. they have 
spent time in prison, their ideology is unchanged." 
Naticnal vigilance. continues to be essential.... The 
governmenes attitude towards PKI remnants has never 
changed. "If they were involved, they were involved and 
there's an end to it!" The names of people involved in 
the PKI movement,. he said, would never be erased till 
their dying day. [Suara Ka:rya. 1 October] . 
The press has meanwhile been full of reports about the 
on-going witch-hunt.. 
*Information Minister Harmoko bas been the most 
vociferous, saying on many occasions that no-one from 
the PKI n1aywork inthe press. "The government will act 
without hesitation, revoking the publishing licence of 
TAPOL Occasional Reports Series 
No. 1 Exchange of Messages with Fretilin commander, 
Gusmao Xanana 
With Lotd Avebw:y, chair, Parlla1nentary Human Rights 
G:r:a:ipatrl Carmel BOOiardjo, 'fAPOL Organising Secretary. 
No. 2 Joint statement by Unicn of Democratic TiJnorese 
and Fretilin,, March 1986 
No. 3 Reactiats from Indooesia to Transmigration 
campaign 
Ind:mesi.an press clippings reacting to too campaign by 
Survival International and 1:Al'OL. 
No. 4 TA POL Statanent en East Timar In ttie UN Conunittre 
of 24, Auqust l 986 
No. 5 The 1987 Indonesian Election in East Tirnor 
An analysis written by TAPOL. 
No. 6 Tl\POJ, StatanEtt.cn East Timar In tie UN Committee 
of 24, August 1987 
No. 7 July 1987 St.atementon the Joint Decision of tl-e 
Chairman of the Supreme Court and M.ln.ister ot Justice. 
By lkadiI\. the Ihdon1>.sian Lawyers' AsSOciation. 
No. 8 World Bank maintains support fur Transmigration 
SUIVival Intemational and TA POL write to Wodd Bank, 
22 January 1988. 
Copies from TJ\POL, BO pence a ccpy, including postage. 
... 
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any publication that ignores this warning." This applies 
both "to ~PKI as well as to their children" he said. 
[Tempo, 15 October) 
* Tempo itself was given a 'stem warning' because it 
published a letter from the lawyer, Oey Tjoe Tat. a 
former political prisoner. "Wittingly or unwittingly, it 
allowed its columns to be used to voice the opinion of a 
member of Baperki which is a banned organisaticn." 
* The Information Ministry announced that it had 
discovered 37 employees regarding whom there are 
indications of involvement in the 1965 events and the 
PKL while regarding arother 14 there were indications 
of an 'unclean-environment'. Some have been dismissed, 
and others shifted to other posts. (Kompas, 30 
September] 
* Six teachers in Jakarta who were discovered to have 
been ex-prisooers, including one who was even a head 
teacher, have now been shifted to other jobs. [suara 
Men:Eka, 28 August} 
* The chairman of the trade union federation, the SPSI, 
Iman Sudarwo respcnded to worries that communists may 
have gained positicus in trade union branches lil the 
plantation sa::tor. He stressed that the 'clean-
environment.' criterion is the top priority in selecting 
functionaries throughout the SPSI. [&Jara Pemba.rl.lfil'\ 21 
September) 
* FollowingaVisittoa number of provinces, Commission 
I of Parliament reported that an unspecified number of 
~mentemployees in Central Java have been dismissed 
for failing to have 'clean-environment' certificates 
Political prisoo.ers before release were all required to 
pledge allegiance to the Pancasila. Here they are seen 
ata ceremony lil September 1978, in Semarang. Now, the 
autb:>rities make a mockery of their own rules. 
(SKBL). In Blitar, East Java, they discoV'ered that the 
children of ~prisoners are unwilling to go on to high 
school because they know they will not be able to get 
'clean-self' or 'clean-environment' certificates (SKBD 
and s KB L) and therefore will not find work. [K edaulat.an 
Rakyat, 6 Septem~r) 
* In East Java, the military commander, Major-General 
S\.Igen:J SUbroto, told members of the same Commission that 
'e.x-PKI' people had managed, by concealing their 
identity, to penetrate an (unnam~ institute. When 
asked how many people were involved, he refus~ to give 
details. He said only that he was not worried about 
security risks as these people were urrler close watc~. 
"Our officers are always able to detect .their 
whereaboots" because "they have all been entered into a 
political organisation which makes it easy for us tD 
keep an eye on them." He refused to name the 
organisation. . . 
He also said that there are 58 A-category political 
prisoners still in prison in East Java. Besides, there 
are 4,291 B-category perSOls, 12,949 C-category persons 
and 426,916 persons required to report regularly to the 
authorities. Reporting requirements for some of the 
latter group have been lifted "but they continue to be 
under surveillance". [Jawa Pos, 7 October] 
* The West Java branch of the lawyers' organisation, 
Ikadin, fully supports a decision by the Hi?h Coort to 
revoke the licence to practice of an Ilcadin member, 
identified only as YLK, who was discovered to have been 
a former PKI member. As soon as Dcadin heard rumours 
aboot y LK, they sumrnorm him to strip him of membership, 
but he had already resigned. [ Pedoman Rakyat, 15 
September] It has also been armounced th~t seve7a1 
public prosa::utors have been dismissed after discoveru:ig 
that members of their family were formerly involved in 
the PKI. [Jawa Pos, 28 September] 
* Only 9,000 o..it of 175,000 government employees who 
were classified in 1974 as C2 and C3 suspects still 
remain in their jobs. Admiral Sudomo has often explained 
that, under a Kopkamtib regulation in 1975, persons in 
these categories were allowed to keep their jobs in~ 
civil service, with the proviso tha.t they did not hold 
'strategic' positions, that they were under constant 
surveillance and that they would be replaced as soon as 
possible. Sudomo offered no explanation for the huge 
drcp in numbers except to say that "some have died, and 
so on". [Kompas, 9 September] 
* 616 ex-ta.pols from Java are now said to be living as 
transmigrants in various parts of South Sumatra. They 
were moved after "extremely careful selection" over the 
period from 1967 to 1987 (an apparent breach of the rule 
thatex-tapols are not allowed tD become transmigrants). 
Colonel Soemarsono, the chief of social and political 
affairs in the provlilce, said that for ·the past 20 
years, they have shown no signs of suspicious or anti-
Pancasila behaviour but any mOITes they make in or out of 
the sites where they live must be closely monitored. 
They should not be allowed to leave their village 
without the permission of the village head, and whenever 
they stay away from home, they must explain what they 
did while they were away. (Kompas, 1 November] ~ 
Indonesia Publications 
For subscriptions information on 
Indonesia News Service, Br:i.efing Bex>ks 
and other publications regarding Indonesia, please 
write to: 
Indonesia Publications 
7538 Newberry Lane, Lanham-Seabrook MD 20706 
U.S.A. 
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Nazi-style snooping and the Muslim trials 
In the trial of Farid Madj.id, a teacher from Madura, 
identified in our last Bulletin only by his initials, 
the prosecutor has dem<mded a sentence of six years. 
The accused is cne of a group of seven persons all of 
whom are to be tried. They met weekly at a religious 
gathering (penga:jian) as Muhamaddiyah members. Farid 
Madjid, 42, is a teacher at a .religious Tsanaw iyah 
scrool, Pondok Pesantren Al Amien in Sumenep, on the 
island of Madura. He also gave lessons on the subject of 
Pancasila Morals. 
According to the prosecutor, H. Moch. Ali Sabtn, the 
group distributed leaflets in order to :influence the 
pub lie. One was entitled, "Wake up before it's too late" 
and included such statements as "Your government is 
heading tDwards dictatorial absolutism. The people are 
being forced . to accept the sole principle 
unconditiooally." (This is a reference to the Pancasila 
which must now be accepted as the mly belief for all 
social and political organisations.) 
The way Farid was arrested is typical Nazi-style 
snooping. As a teacher, he often made critical remarks 
about the gpvemment, saying it was worse than the 
Sukarno government, that many high officials were 
corrupt, and that members of parliament were appointed, 
not elected. Someone who atteooed his lessons reported 
these rema:rks tD the lo::::al military mit who gave him a 
tape-recorder to record Farid in class. These tapes led 
to his arrest. , 
He wasqootedassay.ingthat Golkar people were nottD 
be trusted, that }:he PPP was hypocritical and that the 
third party, P DI, had the wrong ideology. He therefore 
urged people to .mt to vote for any of the parties and 
leave their voting papers blank. In c.uurt, Farid did not 
deny any of this. but did deny that it was subversive. ''I 
am not agajnst the Pancasila," he told the court. 
Amnesty adopts Farid 
Amnesty Internationp.l has decided to adopt Farid as a 
prisoner of conscienee and has called on the Inoonesian 
g::wernment to release him immediately and to investigate 
Far.id Madjid wilh his lawyer during the trial. [Editor, 
3 September] 
allegations that one of the witnesses in his trial was 
tortured. This refers to the alleged leader of the 
group, Haji Sahlan Syakh who was reportedly beaten, 
kicked and then given electric shoe}cs while being 
interrogated by an intelligence officer of the local 
military command, in his capacity as Laksusda. Sahlan is 
said to have eventually agreed to accept the 'sole 
principle' even though he maintained that he had never 
rejected it in the first place. 
According to Amnesty, Sahlan and the other five men 
were releaserl in February this year but reports persist 
that the men will also be tried. 
Sources: Editnr, 13 August 1988, and AI document ASA 
21/16/88. ~ 
TAP()L's Muslim Trials book banned 
The book published by TAPOL last year, Indonesia, 
Muslims on Trial has been banned · by the Attorney 
General. 
We only became aware of the barrfrom a clipping 
reporting that the head of the Pematang Siantar 
office of the Department of Educaticm referred to 
the ban and made public the names of five books, 
incltrling the TA POL title, which were banned from 
use in schools in the region. All schools were 
instructed to rep:>rt to the Attomey ... General if they 
foondanyonepo;sessing, storing or using any of the 
banned books. According to the report, all five 
books are circulating in schools in the region. 
This comes as a surprise to us. As far as we krow, 
01 ly a very limited number of copies have reached 
Indcnesia. It may well be, however, that photocopies 
are circulating. 
The other four banned books are: R:iiual Jahiliyah 
yanJ Ha.tam by H~ Alam Pikiran Kekeluargaan by 
Joes::>ef Ratman, Kembali Kepada Allah yang H.idup di 
Bumi, and Iman dan Amal by Surya. 
Source: Waspada, 1 September 1988.~ 
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Pig-fat scare is subversive, says Sudomo 
A nationwide scare that some popular processed fcxxls 
rontain pig-fat or lard has caused turmoil among Muslims 
and forced leading companies to close down factories 
producing the suspect products. 
Admiral Sudomo, Minister-Cc.ordinator for Social and 
Political Affairs, has now pronounced this a case of 
subversion, alleging that "rightists or . leftists have 
tried to instigate Muslims into burning down factories 
producing the suspect foods, and disrupting political 
stability''. Since there have been r.o press reports about 
factories being burnt down, it must be assumed that the 
press was told not to report the incidents. 
The scare began irmocently enough with a scientific 
report by Dr Tri Susanto from the Food Technology 
Department of Brawijaya University, East Java, on the 
lard, alcoh::>l, shortening . and gelatine content of a 
number of brands. Alth::>ugh it was an internal sb.ldy, a 
section of the report was circulated with an additional 
page said to have been the work of a hitherto unkoown 
group called Muslim Al F allah Scholars. 
'Iheeffectwas devastating. Several wen-known brarrls, 
including Dancow Milk, jointly produced by Nestle and 
Bimantara, a company owned by the Suharto family, and 
Indomie, a product of Liem Sioe Liong, a business 
associate of Suharto's, were severely hit. Companies 
have run frrot::-pa~ ads prcclaim:ing their products hal(ll 
and Suharto made a statement to calm people's fears. 
Now Harmoko, the Information Minister, and Admiral Sucbm~ have warned the press to refrain from reporting 
anything more about the issue. They allege that t;he 
'pig-fat' scare could get out of hand and lead to racial 
riots against the Chinese community. 
Three dailies 'under investigation' 
Three dailes, Pelita, Berl.ta Buana and Jaw a Pos, have 
been given stern reprimands for publishing what are 
regarding as provocative reports about the 'pig-fat' 
issue and have been warned that their licences could be 
revoked if they repeat their mistakes. These are the 
papers that first published the story. 
Minister-Coordinator, Admiral Sudomo has also 
announced that the government has launched an 
investigation to discover why these papers started 
publishing the report. "We want to find out who 
manipulated the findings of Dr 'l'ri Susant:o's sb.ldy and 
who made it possible for this to be reported in the 
press." [Jakarta Post and Kompas, 16 November] ~ 
For the sake of uniformity 
Once again, read-scarves worn by Muslim girls at school 
have led to discriminatory measures against pupils. The 
head of SMAN-I, a senior high school in Bogor, West 
Java, sent a letter in August to the parents of 26 
sch::>ol-girls, objecting to their daughters wearing head-
scarves at school. The head said that wearing head-
scarves conflicts with regulatioos from the Department 
of Education regarding the way children may dress at 
school, even tho\,lgh in every other respect they obeyed 
regulations regarding the wearing of sch::>ol uniform. 
As a result, 17 of the girls decided to conform and 
refrain from wearing their scarves at sch::>ol. Two 
decida:1 to leave the school. (This is as reported by 
Tempo. According to Jawa Pos, 6 October, all the 19 
girls left the sch::>ol.) The other seven decided to fight 
the prohibit.ioo by b.lrning up at school wearing their 
scarves. The teachers exerted pressure by simply 
ignoring them and behaving as if they were not there. 
Althcugh they attended classes, they were given no 
homework, were not allowed to take part in practical 
activities am were prevented from taking examinations. 
S:ix of the girls have r.ow decided to file a civil 
suit, and have approached the Legal Aid Instib.lte (L BH) 
in J ak.arta for help. The case against the head-teacher, 
Ngatijo, is soon to be heard by the Bogor District 
Court. [ Tempq 22 October] Nursyahbani Kacasungkana, 
director of the Jakarta LBH, will fight the case, aloog 
with two other lawyers. 
Four of the Muslim girls who have filed a suit against 
their head-teacher. (Tempo, 22 October 1988] 
In 1984 and 1985, the controversy over head-scarves 
resulted in a number of schools-girls in Jakarta and 
Bandung beinj moved from state to private scrools. But 
this is the first time it has been taken to court.* 
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THE 1965 AFFAIR , 
Suharto's role in the G30S 
Theevmtsof Octnber 1965 which brought General Suharto 
to power are today a matter ot consiqerable attention in 
Indonesia. Suharto's claim that the kidnap and murder of 
six army generals early on 1 October 1965, the so-called 
'coup attempt', was inspired and engineered by the 
Indcnesian Communist Party (PI< J), is the most sacred of 
all New Order dogmas. There are signs however that 
Suharto's version is beqil1ning to wear thin. 
The current politio:U shifts in Indonesia are closely 
linked to the succession, a matter of great importance 
t;o the leader of any dictatorial regime faced with the 
prospectt,hathis m.isoeeds may atlastcome under public 
scrutiny. In SuhartD's case, he needs not only to 
protect his fam.ily' s corporate fortune amassed by the 
abuse of state privilegei he also needs to preserve his 
role in history as the man who came to power not by 
violence but by constitutional means. In particular, he 
needs tn stifle growing suspicions in Ind:mesia that it 
was he who engineered the plot that decimated the army's 
general staff, leaving him the only powerful general in 
a position 1;o seize power from Sukarno. 
On 30 S€ptemberthis year, the Jakarta daily, Merdeka, 
published an editorial ent:itled "Re-tracing history" 
which indirectly quest;i.oned the official version. The 
editorial referred to the events of 23 years ago not as 
the G30S/PKI, the official acronym which inseparably 
links the '30 September Movement' (the G30S) to the PK I, 
but simply as the G30S. It said: "Reviewing the 
bac)<gramd, interactions, and consequences of the G 308, 
we find that there were complicated interactions and 
contradictions such that the. mind cannot easily digest 
them. Historians to this day are still searching and 
examining this big event that brought about dramatic, 
extroorclinary developments in the national scene. They 
seem to be trying to reveal a 11 facts and significance 
surrrunding it. They are still comb:ing the depths to 
discover the unknown truth." [ Merdeka, 30 Sept.ember 
1988, as reproduced in Indonesia News Service,. No 147, 
November l 988J 
The paper was severely reprimanded arrl the journalist 
who wrci:e the editorial was sacked. But the editorial 
tells us a lot about what pecple are discussing these 
days in Inc:bnesia behind closed doors. 
Suharto: ''I took power consti.tntionally 
SpeakingonS Oct:oPer, Armed Fo:rces Day, Suharto said 
the armed forces needed to review all their experiences 
before 1966 and ro oorrect them. "This is the background 
to the birth of the New Order which, from the start, we 
fought for by democratic and constib.lt:i.cnal means." 
[Kompas, 6 October] 
He returned to the same theme a month later when he 
denied that the events leading to the c:bwnfall of 
Sukarno had been unconstitutional. "There w a~ no covert 
coup by the Inc:briesian army." Nor did the 11March1966 
Instruction Ornown by t;he acronym, Supersemar) have 
anything -to do with efforts to bring cbwn Sukarno. "The 
birth of this Instruction did not come about by force of 
arms, as if Bung K arno (the late president) was coerced 
into signing i~'. (For readers who are unfamUiar with 
this evmt, the Supersemar, by which Sukarno surrerrlered 
state power to Suharto, was a document placed before 
Sukarno for his signature by Generals Amir Machmud, 
Achrna:i Jusuf and Basuki Rachrnat, all close allies of 
Suharto. The generals Visited Sukarno in Bogor on the 
afternoon of 11 March 1966, just after he left a cabinet 
meeting at the President's Palace in great haste and 
flew by helicopter to his Bogor residence, on being 
informed fuat tre P~ was surrounded by heavily-armed 
unidentified troops. Sukarno rushed from the meeting in 
such a hurry that he ran in bare fee~ leaving his shoes 
under the table.) 
Suharto said that people abroad still harbour 
erronE:QJ.s ideas about the events of 11 March 1966. The 
source of such ideas is near at hand, right here at 
home, he said. "'!hey are being spread overseas.'' [ Te.mpq. 
12November1988] Suharto also referred to the "Cornell 
Peper'', an early analysis of the 1965 events, published 
in 1971, which was written by two Cornell University 
Indcnesianists, Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey, which 
rejected the official claim of PK I's complicity. 
A Iiew White Book 
It was recently announced that a White Book on the 
events of 1965 is soon to be published by the State 
Secretariat. This will not be the first time the regime 
has published its version of the events that led to 
Suharto's. seizure of power. In the early 1970s, a book 
written by two generals, the late Nugroho Notcsusanto, a 
historian, and the laywer Ismael Saleh who is now 
sei:ving his secarl term as Minister of Justice, set out 
to prove thlt tie October 1965 events were engineered by 
~ 
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the PKI. Their main evidence was a 'confession' by 
Njcno, a rne:nberoftle PKI Polli:bureau, who was tried at 
the beginning of 1966, the first of many PKI leaders to 
be brc::ught to trial. Njono was sentenced to death and 
executed many years ago. But the authors had some 
difficulty with th.is evidence, not least because Njono 
retracted the 'ronfession' during his trial. 
In September 1986, several articles were published in 
Sinar HarapaJl. based on a lengthy interview of three men 
who playerl the key role in staging the political trials 
ba::k in the 1960s. The three men, who were then colonels 
and are now retired army generals, were: Ali Said, 
chairman of the Supreme Court, who in 1965 was on the 
staff of the army's legal department and who 
interrogated many PKI prisoners, including Njmo: 
Dunnawel Achmcrl, now a retired rusinessman but in 1965 
also amemberoftheteam thatinrerrogated Njono, who 
claimErl to have stayed with Njono day and night in his 
cell in order to win his confidence; and Tahir, until 
Ocl:nberthisyearinsp::ctor-General for Development, who 
in 1965 was dep.tty chainnan of the Central Investigation 
Team in charge of interrogating PKI prisoners. 
The three men were at pains to prove that Njono's 
confession, which they extracted soon after Njono was 
General SUharto, flanked by his top generals, at the 
Armed Forces Day man::h-past (Jakarta Post, 6 October] 
arrested in October 1965, was authentic despite grave 
doubts expressed by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey, in 
their "Cornell Paper'', a document that continues b:) 
haunt SUharto to this very day. 
"Durmawel stressed that everything rested on Njono's 
hand-written ronfession. He, Ali said and Tahir were all 
convinced that the original confession, hand-written by 
Njono, disproved various theories abroad doubting the 
central role Of the PKI in the G30S/PKI revolt. 'We 
don1t need to respond to all that,' Ali Said 
reiterated." {S.inar Harapan, 29 September 1986) 
However, the three men were not happy about the 
Nugroho-Saleh account, either. In a long footnote on the 
Njono confession, trn authors suggested that Njono was 
probably '\:lepressed' wren he was being interrogated and 
only came out of his state of depression during his 
trial in court. As the two interr~ators who had 
extracted the confession from Njono, D urrnawel and Ali 
Said described this footnote as "inaccurate' [Sinar 
Harapan, 30 September 1986]. 
They sent Nj:>no's confession as their evidence of PKI 
complicity to then Colonel, now General (ret'd) 
Sudharmooo, who was on the staff of the Supreme 
Operational Command (KOTJ).Sudharmono passed iton to 
Suharto and it was circulated to members of the cabinet 
in order to rebuff a statement Sukarro had recen.tly made 
describing the events of October 1965 as nothing r:io~~ 
than "a ripple in the mighty ocean of the revolution · 
Thereafter, Suharto began to use his special powers, 
whichheobt:aired from President Sukarno on 4 December 
1965 to convoke the Extraordinary Military Tribunal tJefo::e which Njono arrl many other PK I leaders were tried 
and found guilty of complicity in the G 3?S· 
This was ilia beginningoft:re process by which Suharto 
used the law-courts to prove his case against the PKI, 
as Ali Said, Tahir and Durrnawel stressed in the Sinar 
Harapan interview. These three generals, more than 
anyone else in th7 present-~y .leadership, were 
instrumental in helping Suharto in his efforts to make 
his seizure of power appear to be constitutional. 
Their 1986 interview can be seen as part of the 
preparation to re-write tha regime's official versioo of 
what happrned. It is no coincidence that the men who are 
neerled in this effort have remained close to Suharto. 
They are Su:lharmm(.4 who has been at Suharto's side e;ver 
sinre 1965, formerly his State Secreta.ry, arrl now Vice-
President; Ali Said, chairman of the Supreme Court 
already for many years; Ismael Saleh, the Justice 
Minister, and Tahir until October this year Inspector-
General for D evelopmmt; the Inp res office dealing with 
projects financed by a presidential fond, and located in 
Bina G raha, Suharto's official headquarters. 
The role of Kostrad 
But what about the newromer to the presidential team, 
General W arono? A month before W arono was appointed 
General Chairman of Golkar, he replaced Tahir as 
Inspector-General for . Development. Whatever his 
qualifications fortbe .Golkar job, discussed elsewhere 
in this Bulletin, it socn;Hd not be forgotten that in 
1965, Warono was assistant for operations of Kostrad, 
the army s Strategic Command, atthe time Suharto was 
rommar:de,r. It was as Kcstrad commanderthatSuharto was 
able to launch his assault on the troops which kidnappErl 
and rnut"dered the six generals on l October 1965 and 
install himself on the neXI:; day as army chief-of-staff, 
against the w:j.shes of Sukarno. 
As Suharto's operatiCJlS assistant, Wahono would be 
well informed about certain matters discussed in a 
documententltled 'The Role of President Suharto in the 
30 September Movement" that has been circulating for 
several years in Indonesia. According w this cbcuntent, 
Suharto ordered three green-beret infantry battalions, 
Battalion 530from Madiun, BattaLion 454 from Semarang 
and Battalion 3~8 from Bandung, all of Kostrad's 
III/Paracommandos, to be in Jakarta on 28 September 
1965, with full front line combat gear, that is to say, 
armed with ammunition, cu alert and ready to fight in 
combat. These tr()()ps were .inspected by Suharto, as 
Kostrad Commander, on the morning of 30 September, 
meaning, according to the document, that they were 
firmly under his command. (See the translation of the 
first part of this cbcument in Indonesia Reports, 
Politics Supplement, No 25, August 1988.J Less than 24 
hours later, two of these battalions were out in the 
streets of Jakarta, ostensibly acting in support of the 
plotters woo organised the kidnap missions against the 
generals. Suharto has claimed that one of his major 
achievements in turning tre tide on l October 1965 was 
to have · persuaded these troops w abandon the rebel 
cause. Yet although the 'coup' leaders, Lieutenant-
Coloo.el Untung, Colonel Latief and Brigadier-General 
Supardjo, were expecting help from these trocps, their 
role proved to be ambiguous, to say the least. Anct:her 
of the articles published bySinar Harapan in September 
1986 describes how these troops were placed round 
... 
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Merreka Square on the morning of 1 October but did ~to support rebel troops who had oc~pied the 
radio station on the west side of the square, when 
K ostrad forces moved to take control of the radio. 
'£his document, which gives details of the radiograms 
sent by Suharto, also refers to a number of doruments 
and articles that have revealed that the leading 
plotters were on close personal terms with Suharto, and 
regarded him as sympatlmic to their cause. They include 
several articles by the Dutch scholar, w .F. Wertheim, 
and the defen.ce plea by Colonel Latief at · his trial in 
1978. Indeed, as Latief confirmed in court, a couple of 
hours befure the kidnappers set out on their missions, 
at an::uoo midnight., he met Suharto at a hospital where 
the latter's son was under treatment, to i!lforrn hirt\ of 
the moves that would be t.aken against the generals who 
had been targetted for kidnapping. 
As operational assistant, W ahono would have · krown all 
about SUharto' s role in arranging these unexplained 
troop deployments, at Suharto's behest. So now, he too 
takes his place under Suharto's wing, at a time when 
Suharto is about to launch his new definitive account of 
the events of 196 5. In his introduction to thE! 
translatim of the above docmnent, Indonesia Reports 
editor, John MacDougall wonders whether ''the current 
intra-regime conflict (is) really rather more about 
Silharto and his protection - or exposure - by his 
iongrerm allies''. We would add that this document may 
well be one of the sources "near at hand, right here at 
home", referred to recently hy Suharto, which he is now 
determined to rebuff. 
Another piece in the jigsaw of Suharto's current 
manoeuvres is the ex~ution during the past two years of 
five men woo, had they survived, might have one day 
revealed some of the facts Suharto has tried so hard to 
conceal. Sjam Kamaruzzaman, the key figure behind the 
G30S plot, a member of the P.KI's go-called special 
bureau and an intelligellce agent for the army, was 
executed in September 1986, along with Supono 
f1arsudijoyo and Muljoro also known as Bono and as 
Waluyq. bd:h membersofthesp:::cial bureau. Now rome the 
E!xerutioos in October this year of Giyadi and Sukardjo, 
poth members ofthekidnap teams who were found guilty 
of shooting two of the victims. To quote Indonesia 
Reports editor, John Macoougall again: "That the 
executims are occurring only in recent years after $0 
long we attribute mainly to the gradtal drawing down of 
Suharto and his longtime collea9Ues in office and their 
aesire to avoid any µ:>ssilile contingency, such as strong 
jpternat.iDnal pressure, whereby trese p ri.Srners might be 
afforded sufficient freedom to present further narrative 
THIE 1965AEFAIR 
challenges to the original myths of the New Order." 
{Indonesia News Service, No 146, 26 October 1988] 
Another myth comes unstuck 
In October 1965, grisly reports we.re published in 
several Jakarta newspapers, with the two armed forces 
pa~rs, Argkatan Berserrjataand Betit.a Yudha taking the 
lead, alleging that the victims of the kidnap gangs, six 
generals and a soldier on guard at General Nasution's 
home, had been savagely and obscenely mutilated. It was 
claimed that their eyes had been gouged, the bodies cut 
with razors, arid their genitals slashed. This was said 
to be the work of members of Gerwani., the pro-PKI 
women's organisation. These reports were never 
challenged in the press as all newspapers that might 
have dared do so were closed down from 2 October. They 
helped to set alight a wave of anti-communist fervour 
throughout J:ndct1esia, inciting mobs who, alongside 
Suharto's troops, launched the massacres which left an 
estimated one million peep le dead by early 19 66. But the 
reports aloo had the effect of deflecting attention from 
the role of trocps in the action against the generals, 
by alleging that the victims were killed by mutilations 
inflicted on them by civilians. 
It was krown at the time that a team of doctprs had 
been instructed to carry out autopsies of the eorpses. 
These autcpsies were never published and have, until 
recently, .remained one of the unsolved mysteries of 
1965. At the time, President Sukarno frequently 
admonished :Purnalists for their exaggerated account;:s, 
insisting that doctors who had inspected the bodies 
found no ev;i.denoe of the ghastly mutilation of eyes and 
genitiils. It is mw clear that it was not in Sulcarno's 
power to publish theautopsies since they were carried 
outonSubatto's instructions. They were never published 
because it was not in Suharto's interest to have the 
findings . made public. 
The mystery of the autopsies has row been oolved with 
the translation, by Ben Anderson, of the seven autopsies 
carried out on 4 and 5 October 1965 by doctors, ~g 
on instructions from Suharto. The autopsies were 
discqvered by Andersmquit.ebychaoce, while rummaging 
thrcugh tre records of one of the trials held by the 
Extraordinary Military Tribunal. The autopsies show, as 
1\nder:son says, "with reasonable certainty that six 'of 
the victims died by gunfire (the case of Harjono, who 
died in his own oome, remcrins puzzling), and that if 
their bodies suffered ct.her violence, it was the result 
of clubbing with the butts of the guns that fired the 
fatal bullets, or of the damage likely to occur from a 
36-foot fall down a stone-walled well." [See, "How Did 
the Generals Die?' in Indones.iq. No 43, April, 1987, 
Coqiell Southeast Asia Programme.J 
As for the claims about genitals being slashed, the 
autcpsies failed to discover any such thing. On the 
contrary, they reporte:l all the victims' penises to be 
intact, even say.Ing that four were circumcised and three 
were uncircumcised. 
As with many ot:rer dcx::uments, Andersoo' s introductn:ry 
remarks and translation, along with the original 
document, is now circulating in Indonesia, eJ<Ploding one 
of the most outrageous prcpaganda tricks used by the 
army to dismrt history, to conceal tie role of the army 
(ie. of Suharto himself) in the so-called G30S 'coup 
attempt', and to implicate the PKI. 
It is one of Indonesia's greatest tra~es that 
nearly a quarter of a cmtury on, the full story of what 
happened in October 1965 has not yet been told. But the 
... 
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facts are closing in on Suharto, forcing him onto the 
defensive about his seizure of power, involving as it 
did one of the worst massacres of the twentieth century. 
The forthcoming White Paper will be an attempt to stem 
the growing tidal wave of truth which not only threatens 
" HUMAN RIGHTS . 
to engulf SUharto himself as mastermind of the murders 
of General Y ani and other members of the army general 
staff· it will also shatter Suharto's efforts to prove 
that' the New Order regime came to birth by 
constitutional means. ~ 
International support for Pramoedya 
The congressional Committee to Support Writers anc.1 
Journalists has expressed its concern at the Indonesian 
Gmemmertes OO::isim to ban Rumah Kaea. the latest book 
published by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Stating in a letter 
to the Indonesian Charge d' Affaires in W ashi.ngton that 
it understood the book had been banned because it is 
communist, the Committee said: 
"We regret this action which impedes the free(.brn to 
write in Indonesia, and respectfully urge that the 
auth::>rities review the decision. F reeoom to write and 
express ideas peacefully is a key to political stability 
in Inoonesia, as in the rest of the world." 
'Ihe Ccngressimal Committee is a bi-partisan group of 
eleven Senators and sixty-one Members of the House of 
Representatives which was formetl to support freedom tD 
write around the world 
International PEN writes to Suharto 
Following the aooption of a resolution at its 
September ccnference protesting against restrictions on 
Prarnoedya Ananta Toer, the president of International 
PEN, F rarx::is King wrote to President Suharto regarding 
restrictions against the writer, his publishers and 
persons trying to sell his works. 
"Pramoedya Ananta Toer has earned himself an 
international reputation and is often hailed as 
Indonesia's finest writer. 'l'o all who have read Toer's 
thcught-provoldng work arrl thtt>ugh it come to krow more 
about Indonesian culture and history, it seems tragic 
that Indonesians themselves are unable to do likewise. 
Many people believe that far from being a 'subversive', 
Toer has in fact contributed richly to Indonesia's 
cultural heritage .... For these reas:ms we urge you tD 
lift all restrictions on Toer himself, to lift the 
harming orders on his books, to allow his publishers to 
operate freely, and to drop all charges against the two 
students, Bambang SUbono and Isti Nugroho." 
Why not all books about history 
are harmed 
Only a few weeks after yet more books by Pramoedya 
were banna'i, the regime was plunged into a dispute over 
the pros and cons of harming a book about the late 
president., Sukarno. Cit is the irony of regimes like 
this that the only optiOn for dealing with a book with 
which it disagrees is to slap on a ban.) 
In the en:'l, the Sukarno book, Siapa Menabur Angin Akan 
Menuai Badal. (He Who sows the Wind Will Reap the 
Tempes~ by Soegiarso Sujono, alleging that the former 
president was himself involved in the 1965 'coup 
attempt' and was also a communist., was saved from being 
banned by a statement from State Secretary, Major-
G eneral Moerdiooo who declared that "we should show 
maturity in the discussion of history". Yes, but history 
is what Pramoedya's quartet of books is all about. 
The paradox was not lost on the Attorney-General, 
Sukarton Marmosudjono, who was apparently havmg 
problems e><plaining tD the general public why he could 
be so generous to Soegiarso and so iron-fisted to 
Pramcedya. "OUrnetworkofprosecutors should not behave 
like robots when carrying out government policy," he 
said. "You should all read Soegiarso' s book to re lp you 
understand the philosophy of our law enforcement and to 
be able to explain to the public the reasons underlying 
the way we implement these powers, to explain, for 
example, why tlµ.S book is not banned but the books of 
Pramoedya are banned." [Java Pos, 12 OctDber} 
Pram's books 'selling freely' 
"The sale of books is flourishing. Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer's books are being sold illegally, but freely. There 
are no clear sanctions against the sellers or buyers. 
The &men Project minibus terminal (in Jakarta) with its 
nearby book kiosks is where transactions occur. There 
are a lot of security guards arourrl but they cnly keep 
an eye on tie buses and minibuses entering and leaving 
the terminal." 
'l'his report appeared in the Jakarta daily, Jayakarta, 
(27 August] which has spearheaded the campaign against 
Pramoedya. 
"But merchants took a good look first at the 
prospective buyer before making a sale. 'Who knows, a 
person pretending b:> buy might be from Bakin' (State 
Intelligence Coordination Board)." Indonesia News 
Service, [No 138, 26 September] describes this as a 
'sneaky' article whereby the paper wants the authorities 
to crack down on the merchants. ~ 
Pramoedya Anant:a 
Toer, sitting in his 
garden, during a 
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PraIDoedya's Rumah Kaea (The Glass House) 
An essay by Basuki Resobowo 
The last book in the quartet written by Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer while he was a prisoner on Buru island has now been 
published •.• and banned. A few copies have reached the 
outside world, like drops in the ocean, not enough to 
create a stonn, to cause heated discussion. 
I am one of the lucky ones to have a copy and I want 
to tell others about it. But I don't want to write a 
book review because I am very subja::tive about the book. 
I'd rather cal.l this an essay. 
The four historical novels Pramoedya wrote while 
exiled to Buru were published after he was let out (not 
freed). The first three books, This Earth of M.ankinO., A 
Child of All Nations, and Footsteps, were all banned 
soon after appearing in print. [As yet, only the first 
two have appeared in English translation.] 
This last book goes over the events covered in the 
fir&t th~. 'rhey were a trilogy of novels, while Rumah 
Kaea is more like a history of the Indonesian people's 
movementandthe growth ofnational consciousness. It's 
a pity Indonesians are not being allowed to read this 
book on Indonesian history. 
'Primitive Pitllng' and 
'Modern Pibmg' 
Pramoedyastarts by talking about people who reacted 
spontaneously to the brutalities and repression of the 
Dutch colonialists and the European and Chinese 
landlords. They acted without any organisation. One such 
persm was an activist in West Java, Si Pitung. The 
Dutch colonialists regarred unruly peq:>le like Pitung as 
primitive because they had no concept of organisation. 
This was the opinion of the General Secretariat 
{Algemeene SecretarieJ, the special section, whose task 
it was to inform and advise t:he Governor-General. R .M. 
Minke, the man who fourrled an organisation to guide this 
movement. the central figure in Pramoedya's quarter, is 
called the 'Modern Si Pitung'. 
Prop le like Si PitUng had been margi.nalised by society 
an9 became outcasts, infuriated by the conditions 
created by foreigners in positions of power. Wasn't 
theirs an intuitive sense of nai::ionhood? People like Si 
Pibmg were idolisa:l by thecominon poople who flocked to 
lenong theatres wqen plays about Si Pitung were 
performed. This forced the police bureau in Betawi (as 
Jakarta was then called) to setup a special department 
to prcduce lenong plays preaching loyalty b::l the all-
powerful colonial government. 
I like the way Pramoedya uses Si Pi.tung as the symbol 
of res:i.stanoe to injusti<..--e, and later refers to Minke, 
the main character, as the Modern Si Pitung because he 
shaped this resistance into an organisation. 
Pramoedya is a great story-teller with a masterly 
control cf. language~ But sometimes, he gets so carried 
away by the story he is tellir'!g that .. he takes three 
pages to say what could be said in half a page. rt 
reminds me of Emil Zola. The stories are long but the 
interest never flags. Pramoedya's fantasy is firmly 
.:ounded in the lives of people. He has no place for 
abstractions. He ~sn't make anything up. 
SEBUAH ROMAN SEJARAH 
PRAMOEDYA 
ANANTA TOER 
Rum ah K aca is the story of the special section of the 
Governor-General's office, whose job it is to monitor 
developments of the people's movement al)d the activities 
of its le~ders. Reports from all parts of the country 
are studied and analysed. In this way, it examines 
everything going on in the Dutch East Indies. It is as 
if we are on the outside, looking into a glassmuse, 
hence the book's title. Having read this book which goes 
over the same groond as the first three, . I note thatthe 
three novels gave an account of the history of the 
Indonesianpeople's movement from 1911, the beginnings 
ofnatimal ronscimsness (when Sarekat Dagang Islam, or 
the Muslim Traders Leagoo tuma:l iutoSarekat Islam, .the 
Muslim League) up to the death of Minke in 1918. 
The story .in the first three books is not unlike the 
stories in many belle-lettres written in the Dutch 
colonial era, like Nyai Oasima and Melati van Agam. An 
Indonesian woman kept as a ooncubine by a Dutchman 
develops into a woman cf great ability and strength and 
eventually rebels against her life in a gilded cage. 
These are romantic, exotic stories but Pramoedya's 
literary skills are far more powerful and expressive 
than those belle-lettre writers. 
Things changed for the Dutch after 1918. They needed 
t.o educate Indonesians for a new era of colonial 
exploitation; so they began to apply their 'et:h:i,cal 
policy'. This included setting up the Volksraad 
(Peq:ile's Council) in 1919 which incluOOd six Indonesian 
collaborators from q>portnnistic organi.satioos like Budi 
Mulyo, a pseuoonym for Budi Utomo, and the Sarekat 
Islam. There is a passing reference to Semaoen who first 
emerg:'!das a leader at the 1919 national congress of the 
Sarekat Islam. S(:?maoen later became the leader of the 
leftwing movement. 
Pramoedya thrcucjlout writes only about what was g:>ing 
on; he makes no reference to Mane and Engels, not like 
Achdiat K. Mihardja1s Atheist which repeatedly quotes 
Marx and Engels. It is very annoying to read that book; 
the story line is interrupted over and over again 
becausetheaut:tor warts to show how much he understands 
Mand.st treory. By contras~ Pramoedya confires himself 
to his characters and the problems that arise during 
their lifetime. ~ 
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Pramoedya's message 
Does he have a message to rorwey? Yes, indeed, because 
an artist is also a thinker. But P ramoedya does not use 
his thoughts to egg his readers on. He writes only about 
the difficulties of the struggle for emanicipatioo. One 
e.xample of the message he wants to convey is the irony 
of a man woo is trapped by the comfortable life he 
enjoys, having sold himself to the colonial gJVemment. 
This is an Menadorese called Pangemanann (with two 
n's!), who became a senior official in the spePal 
section of the Goven10r-General's office. In the end he 
was dismissed because his services as a spy were no 
longer needed. The comfortable life he had grown 
accustomed to collapsed arrl he was haunted by guilt for 
the crimes he oommitted against his own people. His life 
ended abruptly, drowned by his own sins. 
Is this not a beautiful message for Indonesians who 
are today fighting for a better life, a message for them 
tostan<lfirm? Everyone whot:uzTls traitx>r will be struck 
down by their own sins. 
But I was net. happy with the ending. Pramoedya ends 
his book with a conventional climax, like Nyai Dasima 
and other books in the belle-lettre style which usually 
ended with the heroine rompalining about the injustices 
she suffered In Rumah Kaea. Nyai Sanikem provides the 
climax. In the closing scene, she is Madame Sanikem Le 
B<.u~ marriOO to a Frenchman, demanding retribution for 
all t11e sins against her adcpted son, R.M. Minke. 
The question for me is, why, for a regime so fond of 
banning books, was Achdiat's book, Atheis, full of 
quotations from Mane, never banned while Pramoedya's 
book which makes not a single reference to Marx and 
Engels was banned? Is it because Achdiat can get away 
with quoting Marx because he is not a oommwti.st, while 
Pramoedya stands accused, and has been punished as a 
commwti.st though he never quotes a single line from 
Marx? Evidently the official verdict is that anything 
written by Pramoedya is regarded as a 'latent danger'. 
Arrests and torture in the Moluccas 
Dozens of people were arrested in the Moluccas in June 
and July this year. The most oomplete list is contained 
in an Amnesty International document [ASA 21/14/88] 
which names s:ixteen men and refers also to mass arrests 
in several villages. 
Amnesty a loo reported the maltreatment of prisoners, 
which detainees' relatives heard about from Moluccan 
prison guards. The families were not permitted to visit 
the detainees. Two prironers, Midiel Wattimena and John 
SouisBat were beaten so severely on their knees that 
they were unable to walk. Another was said to have been 
beaten with a trucheon studded with nails while a 
prisoner named Dominggus Pattiwalapia had his nails 
pulled rot under interrogation. Some detainees were 
locked in a cell with a large snake. 
Amnesty fears that two detainess died as the result of 
beatings. They are Mr Patt::l.slllq who was arrested in 
Amboo in Ji.me, Cl'rl Mr Corp.tty, who was arrested in June 
by the police in K airab.I, Ceram. The first names of both 
men are not known. 
Background to the arrests 
Many Moluccans still cherish the idea of an 
irrlependentstate. Although the Republik Maluku Selatan 
$outhMoluo:::as Reµiblic) which was proclaimed in April 
1950 was violmtly crusted by the Inoonesian army, there 
are frequent outbursts in favour of independence. 
Although information from the region is difficult to 
obtair\. occasional visits by Moluccans now living in the 
Netherlarrls has brrught to light a prevailing atmosphere 
of repression and discootent. Attempts to mark the 
anniversary of the proclamation of the RMS by raising 
the RMS flag have been the pretext for renewed waves of 
repressicn. This is koown to have happened in April 1986 
when flag-raising ceremonies took place in several 
villages, Aboru and W asoe on Ha.ruk.u Island, Ouw on 
Saparua Island and Hibl on Ambon Island. On that 
occasicn, protests were rep::>rted throogix:>ut the Moluccas 
in April and May 1986 and many people were arrested, 
tlx>ugh probably just for short periods of time. [AI 
document, ASA 21/00/86]. 
The craving for independeoce has been further enhanced 
by a::cnornic and social developments. The Moluccas is one 
of the most neglected parts of Indonesia with little in 
the way of eccnomic progress. Like West Papua and East 
Timor, commerce is in the han::ls of outsiders while the 
leading civilian arrl military positions are kept in the 
hands of Javanese. There have been three earthquakes 
duting 1988, uprooting many people from their homes. The 
maincrq> is cloves whid1 has recently been severely hit 
by falling world prices. 
The only successful economic project is a plywood 
factory in Ceram which is run by Bob Hassan, one of 
Suharto's close business associates, whose timber and 
forestry interests can only be described as phenomenal. 
Yet the beneficiaries of this project in terms of 
employment:. are not local inhabitants but people brought 
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